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I. INTRODUCTION
Delegates from approximately 150 nations gathered in Rome during the
summer of 1998 to negotiate and finalize the treaty establishing the world's
first permanent international criminal court.1 The convention delegates had to
contend with a wide array of issues. They had to negotiate the provisions of
the court's jurisdiction and substantive law and decide many procedural and
administrative matters. The Rome convention and resulting treaty culminated
a multi-year process to establish a permanent criminal court.3 The United
Nations and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community led this
process. 4 The resulting court, if implemented, will symbolize humankind's
stuttering but determined progress toward curbing human rights abuses.
5
The court that may arise from this progress stands in stark contrast to the
recent human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 6 These
abuses cap a deadly century of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
1. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, By Large Majority, U.N. Conference in Rome
Approves Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 88 (1998); A Strong
International Court, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1998, at Al.
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available in Documents (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/icc/> [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Charles Trueheart, U.N. Conference To Draft War
Crimes Treaty, WASH. POST, June 14, 1998, at A22; UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes with
Decision To Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, M2 Presswire, July 21, 1997, available
in 1998 WL 14097075.
3. See J. Holmes Armstead, Jr., The International Criminal Court: History, Development and
Status, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 745, 745, 749 (1998); Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of
the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 124, 124 (1998). In contrast to the recent efforts of the last few years, the long term efforts to
establish an international court date back to the first half of the twentieth century. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1, 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998); Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the
Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 1-3 (1995). See generally NGO Information (visited Oct.
22, 1999) <http://www.ige.org/icc/html/n.g.o..html> (providing a list of downloadable documents from
a variety of NGOs as well as documents from the Rome convention and from the preparatory committee
meetings leading up to the Rome convention).
4. See M. CherifBassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need To
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 46-54 (1998); Robert
Rosenstock, The Forty-Eighth Session of the International Law Commission, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 365,
365 (1997); Charles Trueheart, Clout Without a Country: The Power of International Lobbies, WASH.
POST, June 18, 1998, at A32.
5. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 11-12, 58-60.
6. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATRocms IN INTERNAnONAL LAW 8 (1997) ("[T]he horrendous atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early and mid-1990s goaded the international community, prompted by
the United States, to seek criminal accountability for them through the creation of international
tribunals.!).
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genocide,7 with the last year of the millennium witnessing ethnic cleansing in
the province of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia.8 Many hope that a
permanent court with worldwide jurisdiction over the most egregious crimes
will help vindicate the rule of law.9 To be successful, the court arising from
the Rome convention must grow in strength and stature as an institution
perceived to be capable of bringing violators to justice.10 If realized, these
goals might allow the International Criminal Court (ICC) to cast a shadow of
deterrence on future human rights violators.
11
The ICC faces numerous challenges and obstacles impeding its
momentum toward these aspirations. One set of barriers has been and will be
of a political nature. To go into effect, the Rome treaty needs sixty countries
to ratify it.12 One major player, the United States, expressed opposition to the
court, and initially threatened to use its influence to pressure other countries
not to sign or ratify the Rome treaty.13 Another set of barriers arises from the
7. See David Stoelting, Rome Treaty Marks Historic Moment in International Criminal Law,
N.Y. L.., Aug. 28, 1998, at 1 ("[T]he Rome treaty stands as a giant step toward a just rule of law at the
close of a century wracked by unparalleled injustice.").
8. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-99-37, para. 6 (ICTY May 24, 1999), available at
Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http:llwww.un.orgticty/milosevicldecision-e/052499rev.htm> [hereinafter Milosevic Review of
Indictment].
9. See Douglass W. Cassel, Judgment at Nuremberg: A Half-Century Appraisal, 112
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1180, 1183-85 (1995); Diane F. Orentlicher, Foreword, War Crimes Tribunals:
The Record and the Prospects, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. I, at x-xi (1998).
10. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at xi. Orentlicher describes the prospects of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) as follows:
Transforming the ICC from the concept envisioned in the Rome statute into a viable,
credible and effective institution will demand the commitment, support, and-when
necessary-criticism of a concerned and engaged public. There will be countless
opportunities for the court to founder, its success is scarcely assured. Still, when the ICC
is created, it will enjoy one significant advantage that the ICTY [International Criminal
Tribunal of Yugoslavia] and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda] lacked:
the assurance from recent example that an international court can meet extraordinary
challenges, mount effective trials, and at last honor the humanity of those who endured
epic crimes.
Id.
11. See Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1-2 ("The purposes of the ICC include: dispensing
exemplary and retributive justice; providing victim redress; recording history; reinforcing social values;
strengthening individual rectitude; educating present and future generations; and more importantly,
deterring and preventing future human depredations." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). The
members of Amnesty International published 16 principles for the permanent court. Principle nine
stated:
An independent prosecutor should have the power to initiate investigations on his or her
own initiative, based on information from any source, subject only to appropriate judicial
scrutiny, and present search and arrest warrants and indictments to the court for approval.
Th[is] is [the] only... truly effective method to ensure that all cases which should be
brought before the court are brought.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES, pt. V
(1998), available at NGO Information (visited Oct. 22, 1999) <http://www.igc.orglicc/html/n.g.o..html>.
12. See Rome Statute, supra note 2. As of October 20, 1999, four countries had ratified the
treaty and 89 countries had indicated an intention to ratify the treaty by signing it. See The CICC
International Criminal Court Home Page (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.igc.org/icc/index.html>.
13. See Kenneth Roth, The Court the US. Doesn't Want, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 19, 1998, at
45, 45, available in 1998 WL 11705704, and available in Archive (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.nybooks.com/nyrevVWWarchdisplay.cgi?19981119045F>.
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daunting administrative and practical requirements necessary to establish an
institution such as the ICC. A cursory review of the headings of the ICC
Statute illustrates the subjects decided in Rome or at the preparatory meetings
leading up to the Rome convention. The decisions on all of these subjects
impact the court's effectiveness to some degree. The delegates had to
negotiate and agree to language for 128 provisions categorized in the thirteen
headings of the ICC Statute: (1) establishment of the court; (2) jurisdiction,
admissibility, and applicable law; (3) general principles of criminal law; (4)
composition and administration of the court; (5) investigation and
prosecution; (6) trial procedure, evidence, and other court functions; (7)
penalties; (8) appeal and revision; (9) international cooperation and judicial
assistance; (10) enforcement; (11) assembly of states parties; (12) financing;
and (13) other miscellaneous matters.
14
Within this panoply of issues related to establishing the court, individual
criminal responsibility provisions are particularly important for an effective
court. One type of individual criminal culpability is the doctrine of command
responsibility, "under which a commander incurs certain legal responsibilities
for the acts of his subordinates." 15 The form of the doctrine at issue in this
Article imputes criminal responsibility to a leader who fails to control his or
her subordinates, and is thus a type of imputed culpability based on the
leader's omissions. 16 The doctrine has three elements: superior-subordinate
relationship, knowledge, and inaction.
17
Individual criminal responsibility, and command responsibility in
particular, are important because, to deter human rights abuses, potential
perpetrators must perceive ICC prosecution as a possible consequence of their
actions.18 Historically, the doctrine of command responsibility has been an
important tool to hold accountable leaders who plan, participate in, or
acquiesce in large-scale human rights abuses. 19 One way that the doctrine
increases deterrence is by providing an ICC prosecutor another legal theory
that can generate additional counts to charge against a leader.20 Thus, the
14. See Rome Statute, supra note 2. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 26-33
(discussing the organization of the Rome convention and the efforts of the delegates).
15. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 119.
16. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 345, 348-50 (1996).
17. See Curt A. Hessler, Note, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L.J. 1274,
1276-77 (1973).
18. See RATHER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 135 ("[A]ccountability may deter future
violations by either demonstrating to those contemplating such offenses the prospect of punishment or
more generally by promoting justice, institutional reform in government, and the rule of law.").
19. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 98-99 (1995).
20. An example of this approach is the set of charges filed against the deputy camp
commander, Hazmin Delic, in the Celebici camp case from the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY Nov. 16, 1998), available at
In the Trial Chamber (visited Oct. 22, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/jugement/partl.
htm> [hereinafter Celebici. The court detailed 49 counts against the defendants, see id. annex B, paras.
16-37, several of which charged that "with respect to those counts above where Hazim Delic is charged
as a direct participant, he is also charged here as a superior," id. para. 22. Two experts further note:
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"scope of the command responsibility doctrine remains one of the most
important issues in prosecuting human rights atrocities. 21 The scope of the
doctrine determines the degree to which a leader can insulate himself from
criminal culpability when the criminal acts were committed by others but
were caused by the leader's lack of diligence, resulting in "poorly trained and
disciplined [subordinates who are] likely to have scant regard for the dictates
of human rights or humanitarian law.,
22
To consider a hypothetical example, a prosecutor's initial claim might be
a direct criminal responsibility claim, such as that the leader ordered soldiers
to rape and kill civilian women. To show how the command responsibility
doctrine allows the prosecutor to bring additional counts, assume that the
soldiers did rape and kill civilian women, but that the evidence was in dispute
as to whether the leader ordered the soldiers' action. In this scenario, the
prosecutor could also bring a command responsibility claim against the leader,
charging that the leader is criminally responsible for the soldiers' actions if the
leader knew or had reason to know of the soldiers' unlawful acts and did not
act to stop or punish them. 3 The command responsibility doctrine creates an
extra incentive for a leader to exercise control over subordinates, and it
diminishes the chances that a leader with evil designs can build a defense to
prosecution by remaining willfully blind.24
Given the command responsibility doctrine's importance,25 and given
the ICC's primary goal of deterring international criminals, especially those
who lead rights-abusing movements,26 the Rome convention developed
surprising new language describing the conditions under which a leader would
be held criminally responsible for the actions of subordinates. The Rome
negotiations delivered a new command responsibility standard that may
weaken the reach of the doctrine for civilian superiors, that is, civilians whose
subordinates have committed crimes that violate the ICC Statute, compared to
the doctrine's reach for military commanders. Amnesty International warned
against weakening command responsibility. It published a list of "ten ways to
wreck the court."27 Item seven from the list specifically mentioned that one
The purpose of the principles of individual criminal responsibility relating to "official
position," "command responsibility" and "superior orders" is to ensure the criminal
responsibility of all persons throughout the chain of command who contributed directly
or indirectly to the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity. This would
include the senior government official who formulated the policies that provided the basis
for criminal activity (such as ethnic cleansing or unrestricted warfare), the superior who
ordered his subordinate to commit the atrocities or looked the' other way knowing that
such things were taking place, as well as the subordinate who actually committed the
heinous act.
1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 19, at 93.
21. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 128.
22. Id.
23. See generally id. at 119-20 (discussing a commander's responsibility for subordinates).
24. See Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86
CAL. L. REv. 939, 1040-41 (1998).
25. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 128.
26. See id. at xxxiii (appraising goals of international criminal law); Bassiouni, supra note 3,
at 2.
27. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 11, pt. V.
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way to wreck the court was to "weaken principles of criminal responsibility,
such as superior responsibility."
28
A weaker civilian command responsibility standard is undesirable
because it will not deter civilian superiors to the same extent as military
commanders. Command responsibility cases decided in the wake of World
War ]129 as well as recent events30 demonstrate that civilian superiors can be
intimately associated with violations of human rights law. Civilian superiors
should be held no less accountable than military commanders for their
involvement with, complicity in, or lack of diligence contributing to these
crimes, as long as civilian accountability does not extend beyond an
objectively justifiable capability to control subordinates, know of atrocities,
and take action to stop them or punish the subordinate offenders.3 1 These
capabilities should be objectively judged so that the doctrine can reach those
who purposefully design a civilian hierarchy that allows them to remain
willfully blind.32 Given that the ICC statue makes criminal only the most
egregious of crimes, 33 a weaker civilian command responsibility doctrine
undercuts the court's goal of strong, individual deterrence.34 Individual
accountability was the watershed development arising from the Nuremberg
trials,35 and individual accountability is what will enable the ICC to meet its
aspirations of deterring human rights abuses and vindicating the rule of law.
Recognizing the importance of the command responsibility doctrine, the
existing international criminal courts include this doctrine 36 in their individual
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., 20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49, 788-92 (R. John
Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981) [hereinafter TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT]; Government
Commissioner v. Roechling, 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, app. B at 1061 (1950) [hereinafter Roechling]; infra
Section V.B (discussing the Roechling case from the post-World War II trials in Germany); infra
Section V.A (discussing the Hirota case from the post-World War II trials in Japan).
30. See infra Part VI (discussing the indictment of'Slobodan Milosevic).
31. See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 128-29 (discussing strict liability of
superiors for abuses of subordinates).
32. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 387; Osiel, supra note 24, at 1040-41.
33. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5 (listing those crimes considered "criminal").
34. See Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1-2 (listing the purposes of the ICC).
35. See LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 35 (1992); id. at 48 ("The trials made clear that even the highest official
could be held liable to the most severe penalty for acts amounting to serious human rights violations.").
36. Traditionally, the doctrine goes by the term "command responsibility." See W.J. Fenrick,
Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 103, 110 n.21 (1995). However, "command
responsibility" may sometimes be used with a restricted meaning to include only military commanders.
See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 63 (1997). The ICC Statute avoids the problem of confusion
between the terms "superior responsibility" and "command responsibility" by entitling article 28
"Responsibility of commanders and other superiors." Rome Statute, supra note 2.
This Article will avoid confusion in terminology with several techniques: (1) It will not use the
term "superior responsibility" except where it appears in quoted material; (2) it will use the term
"command responsibility" to refer to the doctrine generally, whether the leader is a military commander
or a civilian superior, (3) it will follow the ICC article 28 approach of referring to military leaders as
commanders, and civilian leaders as superiors, with the exception of references to the defense of
Superior Orders, discussed in Section 11.D, infra; (4) it will use the term "subordinate" to refer to the
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criminal responsibility provisions. Like the ICC, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) each have a command responsibility provision.
37
In contrast, the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals did not
contain an explicit command responsibility provision. However, despite this,
these two World War II era courts applied the command responsibility
doctrine to some defendants.38 Thus, command responsibility is a recognized
doctrine in international law,39 and its inclusion in the ICC Statute was to be
expected.
Article 28 of the ICC Statute provides that military commanders and
non-military superiors "shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the [ICC] committed by [those] under [their] effective authority
and control."40 Then, in an expression of the doctrine that appears to be
unique, the ICC Statute textually bifurcates the concept of command
responsibility between military commanders and non-military superiors.41 The
latter category will most likely be construed as meaning ordinary civilians,
bureaucrats, and political leaders. 42 While the issue is open to debate, the ICC
command responsibility standard for military commanders is essentially the
current customary international law standard.43 However, the ICC civilian
standard is to some degree weaker and would likely allow some civilian
authorities to escape conviction where the court could reach and punish
military commanders."
underlings of either a military commander or civilian superior, and (5) it will use the term "leader" to
refer to either a military commander or civilian superior. Additionally, the meaning of these terms is
further clarified by remembering that this Article focuses on imputed criminal responsibility, not
"direct" command responsibility, discussed in Section II.B, infra.
37. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(3), available at
<http:llwww.un.orglictr/statute.html> (visited Nov. 3, 1999) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 7(3), available
at <http:lwww.un.orglictylbasiclstatutlstatute.htm> (visited Nov. 3, 1999) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
38. See William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 76-
77 (1973).
39. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 346 ("The doctrine of command
responsibility originated in national military law and gradually became a basis of international criminal
responsibility.").
40. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1), (2).
41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUMMARY OF THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE ICC STATUTE
(1998), available at <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/icc-statute.htm> (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
("[Tihe statute distinguishes between military and other commanders .... For civilian superiors,
however, the standard is higher and the approach apparently unprecedented.').
42. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 296 ("[HIuman rights abuses can range from one
rogue policeman to an entire bureaucracy of governmental officials supported by numerous private
citizens.').
43. See infra Sections ]I.B-Il.D.
44. See NORMAN DORSEN & JERRY FOWLER, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN
IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1999), available at <http://www.igc.
org/icc/html/aclul99907.html> (visited Oct. 22, 1999). Dorsen and Fowler state that "[the Rome Statue
also departs from the [ICTY Statute] by making it more difficult to establish the criminal responsibility
of the civilian superiors of those who commit war crimes .... [T]his provision obviously raises a high
bar to the successful prosecution of civilian leaders." Id.
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Both recent courts and courts from the post-World War II era have had
occasion to construe and apply the command responsibility doctrine.45 The
ICC has arisen during a time when two UN-chartered, country-specific
international tribunals operate specifically in response to planned, large-scale,
systematic human rights violations.46 The ICTY was established on May 25,
1993, 47 while the ICTR was established on November 8, 1994.48 Both courts'
statutes contain command responsibility provisions. In contrast, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals operated just after
World War It.49 Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military
tribunals tried and convicted superiors based on the crimes of their
subordinates, 50 despite the absence of a specific command responsibility
provision in their court-authorizing statutes.51
In light of the experience of these four international criminal courts, and
in light of the experience of other post-World War H courts, this Article
compares the command responsibility provisions embodied in article 28 of the
ICC Statute with the command responsibility doctrine that arose after World
War II, and as implemented and interpreted since then by the ICTY and the
ICTR. In doing this, the Article's goal is to focus on the issue of civilian
command responsibility as codified in the ICC Statute.
To proceed, Part II provides background to sharpen the later discussion
of command responsibility. Specifically, Part II introduces the command
responsibility doctrine and discusses several related doctrines. Next, Part III
completes the preliminary subjects necessary for the Article's main arguments
by briefly tracing the emergence of the command responsibility doctrine and
discussing which variants of the doctrine should be compared to the new ICC
civilian command responsibility standard.
This Article's main arguments rest in Part IV and Part V. The former
argues that changes in two of the key elements of the command responsibility
doctrine produce a civilian command responsibility standard that hinders the
deterrent power of the doctrine for civilian leaders. This argument relies on:
(1) the differences in the text of the ICC military commander standard versus
the ICC Statute's civilian superior standard; and (2) the recent influences on
45. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 351-68.
46. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at xxxi-xxxii; Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 18-19.
47. See Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
48. See Resolution Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
49. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Special Proclamation on the
Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at
3,4.
50. See Parks, supra note 38, at 77.
51. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter Charter of the IMT-N]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11 [hereinafter Charter of the IMT-FE].
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the command responsibility doctrine by the Celebici52 case from the ICTY,
the first international tribunal case since the post-World War II cases to apply
the command responsibility doctrine.5 3 Part V expands the argument by
analyzing the facts of several past cases against the ICC civilian command
responsibility standard.
Only a handful of civilian command responsibility cases exist. The
Article selects from this handful those cases whose facts can illustrate how the
new ICC civilian standard would produce a different outcome than when the
case was originally adjudicated. Part VI then uses the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic in the ICTY to review the application of the ICC command
responsibility doctrine at the highest level in the chain of command. Finally,
Part VII concludes by emphasizing the effect of the changes in the knowledge
element and the superior-subordinate relationship element of the new ICC
civilian command responsibility standard.
II. THE LARGER CONTEXT OF THE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE
In Part IV, this Article will focus on the issue of when, or whether, under
the ICC Statute, a person in a position of authority and control over a
subordinate or subordinates can be held criminally liable for the acts of the
subordinates. In other words, when can a leader be held criminally responsible
under the command responsibility doctrine? The doctrine can create direct
criminal liability, as in the case where a leader orders a subordinate to commit
a crime, and the doctrine can create imputed criminal responsibility when a
leader fails to exercise sufficient diligence in monitoring and controlling his or
her subordinates.54 This second form of the doctrine creates liability from the
leader's omissions, and it is typically expressed in three elements.55 While
many slightly varying formulations exist, these three elements are: (1) the
superior-subordinate relationship element; (2) the knowledge element; and (3)
the inaction element. 6  The superior-subordinate relationship element
concerns whether the commander or superior had sufficient control of the
subordinates; the knowledge element concerns whether the commander or
52. See Celebici, supra note 20.
53. See Press Release: Celebici Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber, No. CC/PIU/364-
E, Nov. 16, 1998, available at <http:lwww.un.org/icty/pressreal/p364-e.htm> (visited Oct. 21, 1999)
('This Judgement is the first elucidation of the concept of command responsibility by an international
judicial body since the cases decided in the wake of the Second World War."); infra Section IV.A
(providing a synopsis of the Celebici case).
54. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 348-50.
55. See, e.g., Celebici, supra note 20, para. 346; Parks, supra note 38, at 20; Sellers &
Okuizumi, supra note 36, at 64; Hessler, supra note 17, at 1276; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 11, pt. I, sec. VI.C.4 (listing six elements). The Celebici court's full formulation of the
elements is as follows:
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or
had been committed; and
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.
Celebici, supra note 20, para. 346.
56. See sources cited supra note 53.
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superior understood or knew that crimes were being committed; and the
inaction element concerns whether the commander or superior acted on his or
her duty to intervene.
5 7
Before examining the command responsibility doctrine in greater detail,
this part first discusses the broader context and related doctrines surrounding
command responsibility. This frames the Article's primary focus, the efficacy
of the ICC's civilian command responsibility standard, for later treatment. In
this undertaking, this part associates the doctrines that provide the broader
context with the relevant provisions in the ICC Statute. Like the ICC Statute's
implementation of command responsibility in article 28, it delineates these
other doctrines by implementing them in designated provisions.
A. Other Forms of Criminal Responsibility
Command responsibility shares some characteristics with other forms of
criminal liability for an accomplice, including, loosely, the concepts of
complicity, accomplice liability, and aiding and abetting.58 All of these
doctrines have the common feature that one is criminally responsible because
of one's relationship or association with others. However, command
responsibility is different in origin and formulation from all of these
doctrines.59 The criminal responsibility provisions of the ICC Statute
recognize this distinction.
In article 25, the statute assigns individual criminal responsibility for one
who aids, abets, assists in, or provides the means for a crime
60 or its attempt.61
Article 25 reaches one who "contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of ... a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. ' '62 Further, for genocide, article 25 reaches one who "directly and
publicly incites others to commit genocide." 63 Thus, the structure of the ICC
Statute clearly delineates these other forms of criminal responsibility from
command responsibility.6
57. See Hessler, supra note 17, at 1276-77. This author characterizes the three elements as (1)
status, that is, superior-subordinate relationship; (2) mental standard and mental object, that is,
knowledge; and (3) duty to intervene, that is, inaction. See id.
58. See PETER W. Low, CRIMINAL LAw 236 (rev. 1st ed. 1990).
59. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 119.
60. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(3)(c). Article 5 of the ICC Statute states that the
'Jurisdiction of the Court will be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community." Id. art. 5. Article 5 then lists the crimes: (a) genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, (c) war
crimes, and (d) crimes of aggression. See id. Articles 6 through 8, which define these crimes, do not
refer to any other international law instruments for the definitions, but instead provide the complete
definition within the ICC Statute. See id. arts. 6-8.
61. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(3)(f).
62. Id. art. 25(3)(d).
63. Id. art. 25(3)(e).
64. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at I 18-19. The authors further state:
Notions of conspiracy and complicity received a clear endorsement in the Nuremberg
Charter, article 6(a) of which criminalized both preparing and conducting aggressive war
and a "common plan or conspiracy" to do so. The [Nuremberg] International Military
Tribunal interpreted the conspiracy charges strictly, limiting the term to acts most closely
involved with the planning of the war and thereby acquitting most of the Nazi leaders
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B. "Direct" Command Responsibility
The ICC Statute encodes "direct" command responsibility in article 25,
while article 28, the section under discussion in this Article, encodes
"imputed" command responsibility. These two types of criminal culpability
are conceptually distinct, yet sometimes they are described as two sub-types
of the command responsibility doctrine.65 The key distinction is that under
direct command responsibility the commander or superior "is held liable for
ordering unlawful acts.",66 In contrast, imputed command responsibility exists
"where the commander is held liable for a subordinate's unlawful conflict
which is not based on the commander's [or superior's] orders."6 7 Thus, while
some references to the command responsibility doctrine discuss the concept of
ordering one's subordinates to commit a crime,68 a complete statement of the
doctrine emphasizes imputed command responsibility as well.6 9
The ICC Statute emphasizes the conceptual distinction between these
two forms of criminal responsibility by placing each in a separate article. For
direct command responsibility, article 25 of the ICC Statute, entitled
"Individual Criminal Responsibility," 70 reaches one who "[o]rders, solicits, or
induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted., 71 Thus, under the ICC Statute, ordering one's subordinates to
perform a crime is not a form of vicarious criminal liability,72 but rather is
individually culpable criminal behavior.73 Conveying patently illegal orders
down the command chain would also fall under the direct command
responsibility rubric.74 Imputed command responsibility under the ICC is
described in article 28, and is a form of vicarious criminal liability because the
liability arises from the relationship between the superior and the subordinate,
and not from the commander or superior's direct action to communicate
charged with them. Control Council Law No. 10 [of the non-international Nuremberg
military tribunals] took a broader view, singling out accessories, those who took a
consenting part, those connected with plans for the crimes, and members of organizations
connected with the crime.
Id.
65. See BASSlOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 345.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 333; L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in
International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 330 (1995); Timothy Wu
& Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates: The Doctrine of
Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 289 (1997).
69. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 345 ("Command responsibility includes two
different concepts of criminal responsibility[,] .. .direct responsibility ... [and] imputed criminal
responsibility...."); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 119-20.
70. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25.
71. Id. art. 25(3)(b).
72. Vicarious criminal liability is generally defined as when the defendant is made liable for
the bad conduct of someone else. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 250
(2d ed. 1986).
73. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 935, paras. 173-74 (1994), reprinted in I GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION 289
(J. Oppenheim & W. van der Wolf eds., 1997).
74.. See Parks, supra note 38, at 77.
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orders initiating the unlawful behavior.75  Thus, imputed command
responsibility is based on a failure of the commander or superior to act. 76 For
example, a military officer might be held criminally responsible under
imputed command responsibility for "failing to establish policies and
procedures for the prevention of violations and for the punishment of
violators, and for failing to implement them. 7 7
Because this Article focuses on imputed command responsibility,
understanding direct command responsibility is only necessary to provide
background and context for the discussion of imputed command
responsibility. Accordingly, the remainder of the Article uses the term
"command responsibility" to refer to imputed command responsibility.
C. Individual Responsibility and Official State Capacity
The prosecutions after World War II established as one of the
Nuremberg Principles the doctrine that individuals can be held criminally
liable for acts which violate international law, even when acting as agents of
the state.78 One's capacity as a state official does not provide a defense. Prior
to the post-World War II prosecutions, a commander was much more likely to
escape criminal responsibility because the commander was supervising
soldiers in his or her capacity as an official of the state.79 The state itself
would be the only entity responsible for the act, even though the state could
not be held criminally responsible.80 For example, assume that a Nazi military
75. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 347. The authors explain: "A person who
issues an order is responsible for that order. This is clearly a standard of direct personal responsibility; a
standard well recognized in the world's major criminal justice systems and in international criminal law.
This responsibility is direct .... Id.
76. See id. at 348. Below, the author describes the commander's duties that make the failure to
act culpable:
[I]mputed command responsibility is based on the commander's failure to act in order to:
1) prevent a specific unlawful conduct; 2) provide for general measures likely to prevent
or deter unlawful conduct; 3) investigate allegations of alleged conduct; and 4) prosecute,
and upon conviction, punish the author of the unlawful conduct.
Id.
77. Id. at 349.
78. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, in Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its
Second Session, 5 June-29 July 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11-14
(1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLIcT 923, 924
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988); cf. Affirmation of the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at
1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946) (expressing approval of the international law applied at the Nuremberg
trials), reprinted in THE LAWS Of ARMED CONFLICT, supra at 921; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at
14 (noting that the Nuremberg concept of individual criminal responsibility received global endorsement
by the U.N. General Assembly).
79. See Parks, supra note 38, at 19. Parks notes that "few instances are recorded prior to the
end of World War II where that responsibility was either criminal or international in nature. The
responsibility existed prior to that time, but there was not sufficient warrant or authorization to interfere
in what was essentially an area of 'state action.'" Id.
80. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 15. Ratner and Abrams also point out that "State
criminal responsibility for certain violations of international law has proved to be exceptionally
controversial.... [I]nternational criminal law, to the extent it has developed to cover violations of
human rights, has centered on individual culpability, on the theory that personal accountability and
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commander follows state policy and orders his forces to turn over prisoners to
the Nazi death camp system. If prosecuted for this action, the Nazi
commander would plead that his role required him to follow the state policy
of turning over prisoners to the camp system. The Nuremberg Principles
negate this plea if the Nazi commander knew that the prisoners were being
murdered or mistreated in the camp system. Thus, piercing the veil of "official
state capacity" is similar to the doctrine that says that "superior orders is not a
defense," discussed in the next section. An accused who claims a defense of
state responsibility or official capacity is claiming that the accused's position,
and not some specific order, required or validly authorized the unlawful acts.
The ICC Statute follows the now well-established international law
norm that official capacity does not immunize a leader.81 Thus, being a state
actor is not a defense to command responsibility liability. On the other side of
the coin, the ICC Statute also ensures that holding the individual criminally
responsible does not limit the state's responsibility under other forms of
international law for the violations.
82
D. The Defense of Following Superior Orders
The ICC Statute provides several defenses, 83 and among these is the
limited defense of superior orders. Some commentators characterize the
superior orders defense as the flip side of command responsibility.84 The
Nuremberg principles expressly limit the defense of superior orders: "The fact
that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him."85 The ICC Statute confines the defense
narrowly so that it does not swallow the entire notion of individual criminal
responsibility, whether in the form of direct participation or in the form of
imputed responsibility via the superior's relationship with his or her
punishment will serve as the best deterrent." Id.
81. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(2) ("A person who commits a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with
this Statute."); id. art. 27(1) ('This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity... shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute .... '); StUNGA, supra note 35, at 35, 48.
82. The ICC Statute states that "[n]o provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal
responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law." Rome Statute, supra note
2, art. 25(4).
83. See id. arts. 26, 30-33. Defenses include: persons under eighteen, mental element, mental
disease or defect, intoxication, self-defense, duress, mistake of fact or law, and superior orders. See id.
84. See Anthony D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
604, 604 (1986); Howard S. Levie, Some Comments on Professor D'Amato's 'Paradox, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 608, 608-09 (1986). See generally Jeanne L. Bakker, Note, The Defense of Obedience to
Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement, 17 A. J. CRIM. L. 55, 56 (1989) (arguing that "the
existence or non-existence of the defense of superior orders, alone, is not determinative of mens rea;
rather, a number of other elements should be considered, including the nature of the orders, the nature of
the threats upon disobedience, and the circumstances surrounding the subordinate when given the
orders").
85. Nuremberg Principles, supra note 78, at 924.
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subordinates. 86 If the superior orders defense were not limited, then "the
acceptance of superior orders on the one hand, and the lack of knowledge as
to [the crimes,] execution by subordinates, on the other, would lead to the
abolishment of any penalty.""
E. Summarizing the Context Surrounding Command Responsibility
In sum, the concepts of (1) individual responsibility (as opposed to state
responsibility or official capacity), (2) direct participatory "command
responsibility," (3) complicity and accessory liability, and (4) the defense of
superior orders provide a context for the core command responsibility
doctrine. In essence, these four doctrines delimit the outer conceptual
boundaries of command responsibility as discussed in this Article. The
structure of the ICC Statute also acknowledges these different doctrines and
their distinct role compared to the role of command responsibility. The ICC
Statute isolates the command responsibility doctrine in article 28, recognizing
its unique character as a criminal liability provision based on neglect of one's
duty to supervise and control subordinates. As recently stated by the ICTY in
the Celebici case: "[T]he criminal responsibility of superiors for failing to take
measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is
best understood when seen against the principle that criminal responsibility
for omissions is incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to act."8
This omission-based character 9 of the command responsibility doctrine
underscores the potential breadth of the doctrine and perhaps explains why it
has not been without controversy.
90
Next, Part Ill discusses the doctrine's elements, which this Article uses
to compare the ICC Statute's civilian command responsibility standard with
its military standard. Some elements do not change between the ICC civilian
and military standards. Analyzing the differences that do exist in the wording
and structure of the elements generates the thesis of this Article: that the new
civilian standard weakens the court's ability to bring civilian perpetrators to
justice for the purpose of deterring human rights abuses.
86. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 121-22. The ICC Statute defines the superior
orders defense as follows:
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a
person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or
civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or
the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity
are manifestly unlawful.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 33.
87. Roechling, supra note 29, at 1106.
88. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 334.
89. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 345 ("Liability... is essentially based on
the commander's failure to act. . ").
90. See Hessler, supra note 17, at 1276-77.
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Ill. ESTABLISHING THE BASIS OF THE COMPARISON
This Article's thesis is that the civilian command responsibility standard
codified in article 28(2) of the ICC Statute reduces the efficacy of the
permanent international criminal court. This argument rests on the premise
that the new civilian standard is less strict than the ICC military standard and
perhaps less strict than the prior law of command responsibility as applied to
civilians. 91 It also rests on the presumption that individual accountability in
the ICC will help deter human rights abuses and that a less strict standard
allows a civilian superior to either exercise less diligence in controlling
subordinates, or have less fear of being convicted when intentionally allowing
or encouraging subordinates to commit human rights abuses. To support these
arguments, this part briefly examines the development of the command
responsibility doctrine to frame the comparison undertaken in Part IV.
A. To What Degree Is the Command Responsibility Doctrine Applied to
Civilians?
Prior to the ICC Statute, one issue in international law was whether the
command responsibility doctrine embodied a single standard that applied to
military commanders (or those effectively acting as military commanders) and
non-military commanders. 92 Even though it arose in military law, the
command responsibility doctrine has in a few instances been applied to
civilian leaders. 93 Compounding this issue, article 28 of the ICC Statute uses
similar language to provide separately two command responsibility standards,
one for military commanders and another for civilian superiors.94
91. Civilians were held criminally liable in the post-World War I courts under command
responsibility theories of liability. See discussion ofHirota, infra Section V.A; discussion of Roechling,
infra Section V.B. By implication, Bassiouni and Manikas question this result because they argue that
different sources of law, and thus different duties, apply to military and non-military personnel
(assuming that the civilian does not have an agency relationship to the military). See BASSIOUNI &
MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 346-48. Under the ICC approach, this concern is lessened because the ICC
Statute details the crimes for which the permanent court would have jurisdiction. See Rome Statute,
supra note 2, art. 5.
92. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 345-51, 368-70; Fenrick, supra note 36, at
103, 115-18.
93. See discussion offHirota, infra Section V.A; discussion ofRoechling, infra Section V.B.
94. The ICC drafters may have avoided the ambiguity of prior law by not choosing between
the two commonly-used terms to designate the leader. This is illustrated by the ICC command
responsibility draft provision, given as follows. While the draft statute text is similar to the text of the
ICTY and ICTR statutes, it contains bracketed text that indicated some disagreement over use of the
terms "commander" and "superior."
Responsibility of rcommanders] [superiors] for acts of [forces under their command]
[subordinates]
[In addition to other forms of responsibility for crimes under this Statute, a
[commander] [superior] is criminally responsible] [A [commander] [superior] is not
relieved of responsibility] for crimes under this Statute committed by [forces]
[subordinates] under his or her command [or authority] and effective control as a result of
the [commander's] [superior's] failure to exercise properly this control where:
(a) the [commander] [superior] either knew, or [owing to the widespread
commission of the offences] [owing to the circumstances at the time] should
have known, that the [forces] [subordinates] were committing or intending to
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Some argue that the command responsibility doctrine should have a
different standard when applied to civilians, 95 and recently the ICTR has even
questioned whether the command responsibility doctrine should be applied to
civilians at all.96 However, international law seems to recognize that the
doctrine applies to civilians in some form.97 Furthermore, the post-World War
II cases discussed in Part V do not implement a lesser standard for civilian
superiors. In any event, whether the pre-ICC civilian command responsibility
standard is different from the pre-ICC military standard is an issue that will
likely remain open to debate, and it is not the purpose of this Article to
directly address or end this debate. Given this debate, the ICC drafters had a
choice: either encode a single standard and apply it to both military and
civilian leaders or encode separate standards for each. By choosing to encode
separate standards, they have raised the issue of whether separate standards
hinder or support the underlying goals of the court.
commit such crimes; and
(b) the [commander] [superior) failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission [or
punish the perpetrators thereof].
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of'Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art.
25, U.N. Doe. AICONF.183/2/Add.l (1998), available at Documents: Draft Statutefor the International
Criminal Court (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icc/>.
One footnote of the draft statute describes the purpose of the alternative, bracketed text as
"highlight[ing] the question whether command responsibility is a form of criminal responsibility in
addition to others or whether it is a principle that commanders are not immune for the acts of their
subordinates." Id. art. 25 n.13.
Another footnote to draft article 25 states that "[m]ost delegations were in favour of extending
the principle of command responsibility to any superior." Id. art. 25 n.10. However, this bracketing does
not suggest that the delegates went into the conference considering an option for a new civilian standard.
Other articles of the draft statute specifically list optional provisions entitled "option I," "option 2," etc.
Such specific designation of alternatives stands in contrast to the mere bracketed text in draft article 25.
However, interestingly, the negotiators could have split draft article 25 along the lines of the bracketed
text to create final article 28.
One clue as to the possible source of the civilian command responsibility standard is provided by
the comments of David Scheffer before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Discussing the
efforts of United States negotiators, Mr. Scheffer stated that "among the objectives we achieved in the
statute of the court [includes] [a]cceptable provisions based on command responsibility and superior
orders." Hearings on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations (July 23, 1998) (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the
Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court), available at <http://www.igc.orgliccl
html/govt.html> (visited Sept. 1, 1999); see also Hall, supra note 3, at 129-30 ("The basic wording and
structure of the article concerning command or superior responsibility was worked out in a cooperative
effort led by France and the United States at the first session... The opinions in the text still reflect
differences between legal systems .... ").
95. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 347-48.
96. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) § 6.2, available at The
Prosecutor Versus Jean-Paul Akayesu <http:ilwww.un.orglictr/english/judgements/akayesuhtml>
(visited Nov. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Akayesu].
97. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 363; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 346,
368-70 ("A non-military commander is responsible for omissions which lead to the commission of
crimes."); Fenrick, supra note 36, at 117-18.
2000] Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the ICC 105
The remainder of this part traces the evolution of the command
responsibility doctrine and examines, in Section III.D, the specific law to be
used in the comparison undertaken by this Article in Part IV.
B. The Law from the Post-World War II Tribunals
The ICTY and the ICTR statutes contain explicit command
responsibility provisions. In contrast, the international military tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo did not.98 This section reviews command responsibility
as established at the Nuremberg and Tokyo international tribunals and by
other post-World War II military court cases.99
The Nuremberg and Tokyo charters are essentially equivalent.10 0 The
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, chartered the Nuremberg international
military tribunal (IMT-N). 10 1 The Tokyo tribunal in the Far East (IMT-FE)
"was set up by proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur... on January
19, 1946."' 1°2 Both the IMT-N and the IMT-FE contained the following
language: "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any
of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons
in execution of such plan." 1°3 Thus, the text of each tribunal's statute only
articulated "direct" command responsibility. However, the United States had
proposed a definition that was never incorporated into any promulgating
order, but that would have established responsibility for the "omission of a
superior officer to prevent war crimes when he knows of, or is on notice as to
their commission or contemplated commission and is in a position to prevent
98. See Fenrick, supra note 36, at 112. Additionally, Fenrick notes:
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
for the Trial of German Major War Criminals addressed the responsibility of military
commanders or other leaders for a failure to act, probably because the degree of
participation by leaders in the offenses for which they were convicted made consideration
of this issue unnecessary.
Id.
99. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 354 ("The issues of command responsibility
were plentiful in the post-World War II prosecutions before the IMT, IMTFE, Subsequent Proceedings,
and the other prosecutions.").
100. See RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 36 (1971);
B.V.A. ROLING, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 2-3 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1995); see also PHILLIP R.
PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST 1945-5 1, at 11-
13 (1979) (discussing the similarities between the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters).
101. See WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE BOOK 9 (Norman E. Tutorow ed., 1986) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES].
Additionally, Tutorow notes:
The IMT Charter gave the signatory nations the power to try and punish the major war
criminals for crimes committed either as individuals or as members of criminal
organizations, as defined in the Charter. The circularity of having victors create a charter
that gave them jurisdiction over areas of law contained in that selfsame charter was not
lost on critics of war crimes tribunals.
Id.
102. Id. at 13; see also LAW OFARMED CONFLICT, supra note 78, at 911.
103. Charter of the IMT-N, supra note 51, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284,
288; Charter of the IMT-FE, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11.
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them."'1 4 Thus, formal, explicit command responsibility was considered but
not included in these two charters.
The most significant command responsibility cases to come from
Nuremberg came from the military trials conducted under Control Council
Law No. 10, not the IMT-N.'05 In the High Command'06 case, the U.S.
military court in Nuremberg rejected a strict liability10 7 concept of criminal
liability. 08 The defendants "held various leading command or staff positions
in the German Armed Forces."'10 9 They were charged with various counts
relating to acts such as slaughtering enemy troops, executing partisans, and
mistreating prisoners. 10 In requiring personal dereliction of duties for
culpability, the High Command court resisted the "near-strict-liability"
standard that some scholars attribute to the In re Yamashita case,111 a U.S.
military trial of a Japanese general for crimes committed by his troops in the
Philippine 
Islands."oo
Perhaps the most cited and discussed post-World War II case,
Yamashita, engenders considerable controversy both for procedural issues and
for the command responsibility standard applied to General Yamashita.1 3 The
104. Parks, supra note 38, at 17.
105. Seeid. at38,58.
106. United States v. Von Leeb (High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 462 (1951)
[hereinafter High Command Case].
107. See Low, supra note 58, at 252 ("Strict liability dispenses with the mens rea. It is
normally imposed on one who has committed a criminal act, but who lacks any moral fault as to one or
more components of the act."). The flip side of strict liability is vicarious liability, which "dispenses
with the actus reus. It is imposed on a defendant who has engaged in no criminal act, based on a crime
committed by a person who stands in a specified relationship to the defendant." Id.; see also LAFAVE &
ScOTr, supra note 72, at 250 (discussing the concept of strict liability in general criminal law).
108. See High Command Case, supra note 106, at 542-49; see also RICHARD L. LAEL, THE
YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 125-27 (1982) (discussing the
Yamashita case and arguing that the Yamashita precedent was eroded by subsequent developments);
Parks, supra note 38, at 43. Parks quotes the heart of the High Command case's description of command
responsibility:
Military subordination is a comprehensive but not conclusive factor in fixing criminal
responsibility. The authority, both administrative and military, of a commander and his
criminal responsibility are related but by no means coextensive.... Criminality does not
attach to every individual in this chain of command from that fact alone. There must be a
personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence
on his part. In the latter case, it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton,
immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.
High Command Case, supra note 106, at 543-44, quoted in Parks, supra note 38, at 43 (emphasis
added).
109. Introduction to the High Command Case, 10 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NORNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 3 (1949).
110. See id.
111. 327U.S. 1(1946).
112. See id. at 10, 13-16. A second important Nuremberg military court command
responsibility case was the Hostage case. See id. at 58 ("The accused, all high-ranking officers of the
military, were charged with being principals and accessories to the murder and deportation of thousands
of [civilians] ... by troops under their command ...").
113. See LAEL, supra note 108, at 121; Fenrick, supra note 36, at 114; Bruce D. Landrum, 7he
Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. REV. 293, 293, 297-
98 (1995). Landrum notes:
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General denied knowing about the atrocities, an orderly pattern of execution
of thousands of civilians, and denied giving orders to massacre Filipinos, and
there was some dispute as to whether effective communications existed from
his location to the troops in the field.11 4 The case is particularly significant in
U.S. domestic law because after his conviction by the military tribunal, the
Supreme Court denied General Yamashita's writ of habeas corpus. 115 Even
the Supreme Court's ruling is disputed, however, as some commentators claim
that the Court endorsed the command responsibility doctrine,116 while others
assert that the Court merely held that the military tribunal had the power to try
General Yamashita. 1 7 For this Article's purposes, these distinctions are not
critical. More important is the synthesized effect of the military tribunal cases,
including Yamashita and High Command, that "a commander's knowledge of
widespread atrocities within the command area was rebuttably presumed
Opinions vary widely on General Yamashita's personal responsibility for the war crimes
on Luzon. Some writers have called him a victim, an "honourable Japanese general" tried
and executed on "trumped-up charges," the subject of a "legalized lynching." Perhaps
Supreme Court Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in the case best summarizes the
argument that Yamashita was a scapegoat. In Justice Murphy's view, the victors in the
battle had done everything possible to disrupt Yamashita's command, control, and
communications, and now they were charging him with having committed a war crime
for not having effectively controlled his troops.
On the other hand, in a well-researched and persuasively written article, William
H. Parks points out evidence in the record that General Yamashita personally ordered or
authorized at least 2000 summary executions. Other evidence, although perhaps more
questionable in reliability, indicated that Yamashita had ordered an extermination
campaign against all Filipinos. This seems unlikely considering that most of the atrocities
occurred in sectors physically distant from Yamashita. As Richard Lael observes in his
book, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility, ifYamashita
had ordered the atrocities, there probably would have been more offenses in his sector. Of
course, the Manila sector was the most densely populated area, so inevitably more
atrocities occurred there.
In any case, Parks takes the view that Yamashita was not held to a standard of
commander's strict liability, as many have claimed, but had participated personally in the
war crimes. Lael, on the other hand, believes that Yamashita was held to "strict
accountability," but agrees that the case has been misinterpreted. That the Supreme Court
upheld the verdict of the military commission has been misinterpreted by many to mean
that the Court approved the strict standard that the commission applied to Yamashita. To
the contrary, the Supreme Court merely held that a commander has a duty to protect
prisoners and civilians, but did not hold that Yamashita had violated the duty under the
facts of that case.
Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted).
114. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14, 33-34.
115. Seeid. at24-26.
116. See Christopher N. Crowe, Note, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The
Chances for Successful Prosecution, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 191, 204 (1994). The U.S. Supreme Court, in
an opinion delivered by Justice Stone, stated, inter alia, that the "gist of the charge" leveled against
Yamashita was for "unlawful breach of duty." Thus, the Court was concerned with whether an army
commander is duty bound to "take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the
troops under his command" and whether violations of the law of war that result from the commander
failing this duty attach to him personal responsibility. The Court was impressed with the law of war's
purpose "to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality." This purpose is defeated
when an invading commander is allowed to neglect with impunity the protection of civilians and
prisoners of war and, accordingly, "the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through
the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their
subordinates." Id. (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Landrum, supra note 113, at 296.
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rather than irrebuttably presumed," because this assessment indicates the
evidentiary burden allocated to the prosecutor and defendant in the knowledge
element of the doctrine.
118
Just as some of the most important command responsibility cases at
Nuremberg came from military tribunals, and not the international military
tribunals,119 the Yamashita case illustrates this same phenomenon in the Far
East. As in post-World War II Germany, military tribunals in the Far East
produced significant command responsibility cases. 12 The IMT-FE, or Tokyo
tribunal, also contributed to the international law of command responsibility.
Even though a specific command responsibility provision was lacking, the
defendants at IMT-FE were charged under Count 55121 with negative
criminality-that they "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty
to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the
laws and customs of war."
122
118. See id. at 298. Landrum also notes that:
Yamashita marked the high point for a commander's criminal responsibility for
subordinates' actions. In 1948, two cases tried before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
adopted more limited liability standards for commanders. In The Hostage Case, the
command responsibility concept was primarily refined from a "must have known"
standard to more of a "should have known" standard.
Id. (citations omitted). Parks synthesizes the three cases in the following passage:
As in Yamashita, there was seldom any question that offenses occurred [in the High
Command and Hostage cases]; the question left for resolution concerned the standard of
responsibility and, given the determination of that standard, the individual responsibility
of each accused. Yamashita had confirmed the existence of duty and responsibility; the
High Command and Hostage tribunals sought to achieve some definitional value for
each. Yamashita addressed the duty and responsibility of the commander with a broad
brush; the High Command and Hostage cases provided more of the detail necessary to
complete the picture. Significantly, both minimum and maximum lines were drawn, the
latter in express rejection of any purported Yamashita-strict liability theory. That
rejection was not merely of the strict liability theory per se but of the proposition that
Yamashita represents such a theory.
Parks, supra note 38, at 63-64.
119. Military tribunals, unlike international military tribunals, derive their authority from a
single country. See Parks, supra note 38, at 17-20.
120. See id. at 64-73.
121. See 1 TOKYo TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 70-71.
122. MINEAR, supra note 100, at 67 (citing Count 55); see also Parks, supra note 38, at 65
(discussing Count 55). Parks further states:
Two points raised previously in the Yamashita trial were again raised by the military
leaders in the Tokyo trial. The first was an objection to the theory of vicarious
responsibility for acts committed by subordinates .... Where a commander had the
responsibility to act, while he could delegate the authority, he could not delegate the
responsibility; in the words of the tribunal, "He does not discharge his duty by merely
instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application."
The second defense went to the subjective standards in individual cases. Like General
Yamashita, the defendants argued that their failure of compliance was based upon
impossibility of performance; that the allied offensive had forced conditions to
deteriorate not only in prisoner of war camps but overall, and that it was impossible for
military commanders in the field to maintain communication and control of their troops
because of the deteriorating conditions.
Id. at 66-67.
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Having reviewed application of the command responsibility doctrine in
some of the most influential post-World War II cases that apply the doctrine,
the Article next discusses the evolution of the doctrine after World War II.
C. More Recent Developments
In the interim between the post-World War H tribunals and the ICTY
and ICTR tribunals, the most significant development for the international law
of command responsibility is the encoding of the doctrine in 1977 as part of
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.123 After rejecting
two "should have known" formulations, 124 the delegations negotiating the
Protocol settled on the following standard:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach. 12
The Additional Protocol directly influenced the Celebici court's
construction of article 7(3), the command responsibility provision of the
ICTY.126  The ICTY and ICTR command responsibility provisions are
substantially equivalent and describe command responsibility as follows:
The fact that any of the acts... was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or
her superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
123. See Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocols I and 11]; see also
LAEL, supra note 108, at 133-35 (discussing Protocol I and the convention at which it was passed);
ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMEs: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 231-32
(1998) (commenting on the Protocol).
124. See LAEL, supra note 108, at 134-35. The first rejected formulation was: "if [the
commander] knew or should have known that [the subordinate] was committing or would commit such a
breach and if [the commander] did not take measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach
.. " Id. at 135. The second rejected formulation was "if [the commander] knew or should reasonably
have known in the circumstances at the time that [the subordinate] was committing or would commit
such a breach .... Id. (emphasis added).
125. Protocols I and 1, supra note 123, art. 86(2) at 1428-29 (emphasis added); see also LAEL,
supra note 108, at 134 (quoting the Protocols); Crowe, supra note 116, at 225 (same); Green, supra note
68, at 341 (same).
126. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 390-93. However, one commentator believes that the
ICTY statute moves the standard closer to Yamashita than to the Protocol:
Finally, Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia disregards the limitations placed on the responsibility of commanders for acts
of their subordinates contained in Article 86(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I ("if they
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time") and adopts a test more closely resembling the much-maligned
rule of the Yamashita Case: "if he knew or had reason to know."
Levie, supra note 3, at 13 (citations omitted).
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thereof.
127
While many of the indictments in both the ICTY and the ICTR contain
counts based on command responsibility, the Celebici case in the ICTY is the
first international military tribunal opinion to hold a defendant liable under
this formalization of command responsibility.12 8 This Article examines the
Celebici opinion more closely in Part IV when discussing the specific
elements of command responsibility. The Celebici opinion reviewed and
discussed all of the command responsibility cases and legal developments
highlighted here in Part 1H. The discussion in this part shows that the doctrine
of command responsibility has evolved historically in close proximity to some
of the most monstrous events of the modem world, and this history of the
doctrine forms its current content and creates a starting point to compare the
doctrine with the ICC command responsibility provision.
D. Which Law To Compare?
The drafters of the ICC Statute created separate provisions for the
military and civilian command responsibility standards that are structurally
similar but differ in wording with respect to the superior-subordinate element
and the knowledge element. This invites a comparison of the new ICC civilian
standard with the ICC military standard. The ICC military standard will be
interpreted in light of existing customary international law. Therefore, the
comparison should start with the military command responsibility standard in
customary international law.129 On the civilian side, it is difficult to assess
whether the ICC civilian standard is a departure from prior customary
international law for civilian command responsibility for two reasons: (1) The
holdings of the handful of civilian cases tried after World War II are subject to
various interpretations; 130 and (2) the source of a civilian superior's duty may
be difficult to determine and may be less onerous than a military commander's
duty. 131 Thus, to the extent that a lower standard may have developed for
127. See ICTR Statute, supra note 37; ICTY Statute, supra note 37.
128. See Press Release: Celebici Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber, No. CC/PIU/364-
E, Nov. 16, 1998, available at <http://www.un.orglictylpressreal/p364-e.htm> (visited Nov. 3, 1999).
The press release states:
This Judgement is the first elucidation of the concept of command responsibility by an
international judicial body since the cases decided in the wake of the Second World War.
It emphasizes that the doctrine of command responsibility encompasses "not only
military commanders, but also civilians holding positions of authority" and "not only
persons in de jure positions but also those in such positions de facto.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
129. The text of the ICC has not yet been interpreted by a court, although the ICTY has noticed
the ICC text and commented on article 28 of the ICC Statute. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 342,
393. In conjunction with its declaration that it "makes no finding as to the present content of customary
law" with respect to command responsibility, the court also referred to the recently enacted ICC treaty
and its command responsibility provisions in article 28. Id. para. 393. Thus, the ICC Statute may also
influence customary international law to the extent that the ICC military standard is different.
130. See, e.g., Fenrick, supra note 36, at 115-18.
131. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 346, 368-70; Fenrick, supra note 36, at 118
("[P]olitical and bureaucratic leaders may be held responsible for the acts of subordinates when the
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civilian command responsibility, one could argue that the ICC standard
merely codifies this lower standard. However, it is also plausible that the
civilian standard is being newly developed for international tribunals that have
explicit command responsibility provisions in their charters. The different
paths taken by the ICTY and ICTR in the Celebici and Akayesu cases suggest
this possibility. In Akayesu, the ICTR declined to apply a broad version of the
command responsibility doctrine to the mayor of a town in Rwanda where the
local militia committed abuses against displaced Tutsis taking refuge in the
town. 132 Further, it is unlikely that a clear synthesis of a civilian command
responsibility standard will emerge from the post-World War II cases,
although some of the cases can be "used as a guide for establishing that
civilian leaders can be held culpable for certain acts of subordinates."
133
Given that the pre-ICC status of the civilian command responsibility
standard is plausibly in dispute, this Article compares the text of the ICC
civilian standard to the text of the ICC military command responsibility
standard because the ICC drafters clearly chose to delineate the two standards.
This Article also compares the ICC standard to the most recent case
interpreting the command responsibility doctrine, the Celebici prison camp
case. This comparison is informed by the command responsibility doctrine's
history prior to Celebici. During this history the doctrine operated primarily in
the military context, but was on occasion applied to civilians.134 Strictly
speaking, the court's reasoning in Celebici merely construes the ICTY
statute's command responsibility provision en route to convicting the prison
camp commander under that provision.1 35 However, the Celebici court treats
command responsibility in great detail and uses the doctrine to convict a
commander. 136 Furthermore, the Celebici court extensively reviews the
command responsibility doctrine as applied to civilians, 137 probably for the
purpose of supporting its holding to the extent that the camp commander
could be characterized as a civilian leader. Thus, it is likely that the current
best evidence of customary international law for command responsibility is
the Celebici case because of its thorough treatment of the doctrine. 138 The
leaders have a duty established either directly by international law or indirectly by domestic law or
practice to ensure that their subordinates comply with the law .... .
132. See Akayesu, supra note 96, §§ 6.2,7.1.
133. Fenrick, supra note 36, at 117-18.
134. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 343, 368.
135. Celebici was the location of a prison camp that housed Bosnian Serbs; its commander, its
deputy commander, and a guard were convicted of various human rights abuses of the prisoners. See
Trial Information Sheet: Delalic & Others Case (1T-96-21-A) (visited Nov. 3, 1999)
<http://www.un.orglicty/glance/celebici.htm>; infra Section IV.A (providing a synopsis of the Celebici
case).
136. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 775.
137. See id. paras. 355-63.
138 See id. paras. 333-43. Another commentator foreshadows the effect the ICTY and ICTR
might have on the command responsibility doctrine while commenting that the doctrine inserts
a due diligence standard in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions ("if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or
repress the breach"), and, in somewhat different language, [inserts a due diligence
standard] in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The future case law of these two Tribunals may further clarify
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court self-consciously declares that "the principle of individual criminal
responsibility of superiors for failure to prevent the crimes committed by
subordinates forms part of customary international law."
139
The fact that Celebici is the first international criminal tribunal since the
post-World War II tribunals to hold a superior criminally liable under the
command responsibility doctrine 140  further supports the argument that
Celebici is good evidence of the state of customary international law.141 On
the other hand, Akayesu, an ICTR case, which this Article analyzes in Section
V.C, also discussed command responsibility and hesitated to apply the
military standard to civilians. 42  Thus, the ICTR construed command
responsibility for civilians differently than the court in Celebici.143 As the
analysis in Section V.C demonstrates, Celebici seems better reasoned and
better rooted in evidence of customary international law. Although the
defendant in Akayesu is more readily characterized as a civilian, this
characterization is open to dispute. Thus, the two cases tangentially contribute
to the debate while neither conclusively resolves the issue. Indeed, searching
for conclusiveness in a prior civilian standard may be futile because the post-
World War II cases are subject to the overriding criticism that they embody
victor's justice and retroactive application of the law.144 In contrast, the
establishment of the ICC, whose charter defines in detail the substantive
crimes that can be brought before the court,145 eliminates these criticisms for
cases that would eventually come before the ICC.
the [command responsibility doctrine] and its place in customary law.
Theodor Meron, Crimes and Accountability in Shakespeare, 92 AM. J. INT'LL. 1, 14 (1998).
139. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 343.
140. See Richard Norton-Taylor, War Crimes Tribunal Jails Three for Torture of Serbs: A
Warning to Civil and Military Commanders, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 17, 1998, at 14, available in
1998 WL 18677717. This author also notes that with regard to command responsibility, "the statute of
the permanent international criminal court, agreed in Rome in July, is weaker." Id.
141. See Olivia Swaak-Goldman, International Decision, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 514, 518-19
(1999) (reviewing the Celebici case) ("The [Celebici] judgment, in enunciating the parameters of the
[command responsibility] principle, including the essential elements, will be of great value to other
courts, both international and municipal, charged with addressing this issue."). See generally Richard
May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, the Hague, and
Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1999) (describing the Celebici court's treatment and
handling of evidence as part of a larger discussion of evidence trends in international criminal
decisions).
142. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 7.1.
143. See id. § 7.1. The judgment date of Akayesu is more than two months prior to that of
Celebici. The court in Celebici cited Akayesu in several places in its discussion of rape. However, in
what one could interpret as a rejection of the Akayesu court's command responsibility logic, the Celebici
court does not cite Akayesu anywhere during its command responsibility discussion.
144. See MINEAR, supra note 100, at xi, 12-19; R. John Pritchard, General Preface to the
Collection, in 2 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST at xlvi-xlvii (R. John Pritchard ed.
1998); Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 8; May & Wierda, supra note 141, at 764. Minear writes that "where
the present state of international law was unclear or unsatisfactory-as, for example, in regard to
individual responsibility for acts of state-then the Big Four would codify international law in such a
way that German and Japanese acts became criminal and individual enemy leaders became
accountable." MINEAR, supra note 100, at 16.
145. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5-9.
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To answer the question of "which law to compare," this section has
indicated that the primary comparison will be between the text of the ICC
military and civilian standards. Comparing the text of each standard is the
purpose of Part IV. Then, to give the comparison greater meaning, Part V
applies the facts of several command responsibility cases involving civilian
leaders to the ICC text. These cases were selected from the small number of
civilian command responsibility cases because their facts show how a civilian
leader could plausibly escape conviction under the ICC civilian standard, but
probably would not escape conviction if the language of the ICC military
standard were applied. Each case in Part V helps underscore different aspects
of the comparison between the ICC civilian and military standards.
IV. THE ICC STANDARD-COMPARiNG CIVIIAN AND MILITARY COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY
This part will compare the ICC civilian standard to the ICC military
standard by focusing on the first element, the superior-subordinate
relationship, and on the second element, the standard of knowledge for the
superior, because these two elements have significant textual differences
between the two standards. This Article's comparison does not address the
third command responsibility element, the inaction element, because in the
ICC this element is substantively identical for either type of leader, military or
civilian. 146 Within the first element, the concern is whether a pre-ICC
requirement exists for a connection between the crime and the leader's control
of the subordinate, because the ICC Statute may have added this new nexus
element for civilian superiors to be held liable. Within the second element, the
concern is with the level of diligence a leader must exercise in monitoring and
controlling subordinates.
A. The Elements of Command Responsibility That Frame the Comparison
The ICTY in the Celebici case expounded upon the intricacies of each
element of the command responsibility doctrine. The case concerned a prison
camp used by Croat forces to house Serb prisoners during the civil war in the
former Yugoslavia.147 Of the four defendants, three were charged with
command responsibility for various human rights violations such as murder,
torture, and cruel treatment, which included acts of rape.148 One of the three,
the camp commander, Zdravko Mucic, was convicted for the command
responsibility counts. 149 The court stated its holding as follows:
Mr. Mucie was the de facto commander of the Celebici prison-camp. He exercised
de facto authority over the prison-camp, the deputy commander and the guards.
Mr. Mucic is accordingly criminally responsible for the acts of the personnel in the
146. See infra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
147. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 109, 120, 122, 130, 141-43, 146-57.
148. See id. paras. 3-29.
149. See id. paras. 775.
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Celebici prison-camp, on the basis of the principle of superior responsibility.
150
The ICTY in the Celebici case construed the following three elements
from the text of article 7(3) of the ICTY statute:
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or
had been committed; and
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.'5'
These same three elements are readily apparent in article 28(1), the ICC
military commander standard, as shown below.
1. A military commander or person effectively acting as a
military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his
or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such forces, [relationship element]
where:
(a) That military commander or person either knew or, owing
to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces
were committing or about to commit such crimes; [knowledge
element] and
(b) That military commander or person failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. [inaction
element]
152
The ICC civilian standard, article 28(2), additionally embodies these
same three elements. It is presented below in a manner to show the changes
between article 28(2) and article 28(1).
4. 2. A militay .. mma.der. or- pen offeetive"ly ating as a
m"ilitary .. mmandc With respect to superior and subordinate
relationships not described in paragraph 1, a superior shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by frees subordinates under his or her effective
eem. authority and control, o- effeetive auth.rity and contrel
as th .ease may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such Aeees subordinates where:
150. Id. para. 776.
151. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 346.
152. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1) (emphasized and bracketed text added to identify
elements).
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(a) That mailitar; zem-ma--der or persean either kncw or, owing
to the cireufmtancem at th-e time, should have known that the foree
The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which dearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes; and
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the
effective responsibility and control of the superior and
(b) That militar ef. a'eor er person(c) The superior failed
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
153
While the ICC civilian standard has the same three elements as the
military standard, it may arguably add a fourth element with the provision of
article 28(2)(b), 154 a requirement for a nexus between the criminal activity of
the subordinate and the subordinate's activities that the superior can control.
On the other hand, one could also interpret article 28(2)(b) as merely a
modification of the superior-subordinate relationship element.
As the ICC provisions reveal, the heart of the comparison of civil and
military command responsibility requires examination of the superior-
subordinate relationship element and the knowledge element. The change to
the inaction element does not require analysis because it is not substantive.
The Celebici court treatment of the inaction element was terse and
straightforward,155 also indicating that this element poses the fewest doctrinal
challenges. Additionally, the language of the ICC inaction element is similar
to the ICTY and ICTR inaction element language, 156 suggesting that the ICC
153. Id. art. 28(2).
154. Id. art. 28(2)(b) ("The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior. ..
155. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 394-95. The Celebici court's analysis of the inaction
element is given below:
The legal duty which rests upon all individuals in positions of superior authority requires
them to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of
offences by their subordinates or, if such crimes have been committed, to punish the
perpetrators thereof. It is the view of the Trial Chamber that any evaluation of the action
taken by a superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked
to the facts of each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in
abstracto would not be meaningful.
It must, however, be recognized that international law cannot oblige a superior to
perform the impossible. Hence, a superior may only be held criminally responsible for
failing to take such measures that are within his powers. The question then arises of what
actions are to be considered to be within the superior's powers in this sense. As the
corollary to the standard adopted by the Trial Chamber with respect to the concept of
superior, we conclude that a superior should be held responsible for failing to take such
measures that are within his material possibility. The Trial Chamber accordingly does not
adopt the position taken by the ILC on this point, and finds that the lack of formal legal
competence to take the necessary measures to prevent or repress the crime in question
does not necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility of the superior.
Id.
156. ICTR Statute, supra note 37, art. 6(3) ('[T]he superior failed to take the necessary and
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might construe articles 28(l)(b) and 28(2)(c) along the lines that the Celebici
court construed the inaction element. 15 In sum, it is unlikely that the legal
standard for the inaction element will differ greatly for civilian superiors
versus military commanders.
158
B. The Superior-Subordinate Relationship Element
1. The Text of the ICC Statute
Article 28(1) of the ICC Statute applies to a "military commander or
person effectively acting as a military commander."15 9 In contrast, article
28(2) applies to "superior and subordinate relationships not described in
paragraph 1,,,160 that is, non-military superior-subordinate relationships.
Historically, the military command responsibility doctrine applied not only to
military commanders, but also to civilians. 161 Thus, one can argue that in
bifurcating the command responsibility standard based on the type of
superior-subordinate relationship, the ICC Statute lessens the efficacy of the
permanent court because the bifurcated structure allows a lesser knowledge
standard for civilians, that is, "consciously disregarded," and allows the
potentially new nexus element, that is, "crimes concerned activities," to also
potentially bar liability for civilians.
162
2. Celebici on the Superior-Subordinate Relationship Element
The court in Celebici discussed the nature of the superior-subordinate
relationship at issue in the ICTY Statute's command responsibility provision.
To construe the word "superior," the court analyzed several cases, including
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.'); ICTY Statute, supra
note 37, art. 7(3) ("[T]he superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.").
157. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 394-400. The defense also asserted "the existence of a
separate requirement of causation," which the court rejected. Id. paras. 396-99.
158. This Article follows the ICC article 28 approach of referring to military leaders as
commanders, and civilian leaders as superiors. See supra note 36.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1). The "effectively acting as a military commander"
civilian role is rooted in Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. See W. Hays Parks, A Few Tools in the
Prosecution of War Crimes, 149 MIL. L. Rv. 73, 77 (1995). Parks further notes:
Article 87 of Protocol I is entitled Duty of Commanders while actually setting forth the
responsibilities of High Contracting Parties and Parties to a conflict to ensure that their
respective military commanders comply with the law of war in their conduct of military
operations. Although the title may appear misleading, it is not; a civilian in the command
and control chain, such as the President of the United States, is a commander for these
purposes, as previously acknowledged in the High Command Case. Applying the term
commander or command responsibility to civilians apparently has caused some problems
for the ICTY, which has coined the term superior authority to cover all cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2).
161. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 355-63. After discussing several post-World War II
civilian superior cases from both Germany and Japan, the court concludes that "the applicability of the
principle of superior responsibility ... extends not only to military commanders but also to individuals
in non-military positions of superior authority." Id. para. 363.
162. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2)(a), (b).
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the High Command and Hostage cases. 163 The Celebici court held that while
formal designation as a commander was not necessary, de facto or de jure
possession of powers of control over actions of subordinates was in some
cases sufficient to qualify one as a "superior."' 164 Further, the court specifically
held that a superior may be a military person or a civilian.
165
However, the final statement in the court's holding on the superior-
subordinate relationship element significantly limits the potential breadth of
the language above. The court recognized that there is a "threshold at which
persons cease to possess the necessary powers of control over the actual
perpetrators of offences, and, accordingly, cannot properly be considered their
'superiors .... 166 Then the court finds that a superior must have "material
ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences," and further
states:
With the caveat that such authority can have a defacto as well as a dejure character, the
Trial Chamber accordingly shares the view expressed by the International Law
Commission that the doctrine of superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only
to the extent that they exercise a de ee of control over their subordinates which is
similar to that of military commanders. 
6
Thus, the court concludes that civilian superiors are only liable under
command responsibility to the extent that they operate as military
commanders, that is, exercise a military-like degree of control over their
subordinates. Determining whether an individual operates as a military
commander would be a factual inquiry. The more the individual's
organization resembled the traditional armed forces, the more likely this
individual, if a leader with formal power and authority within the
organization, would be characterized as a military commander. Civilians
would be evaluated as a military commander if they were in the chain of
command performing the function of a military commander. 168 The Celebici
court's final holding is actually more limited than the facts of the cases that it
163. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 365-68; see also supra notes 105-112 and
accompanying text (discussing High Command and Hostage).
164. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 370.
165. See id. para. 377. To the extent that a camp commander would be viewed primarily as a
military commander, the Celebici court's discussion of command responsibility for non-military
superiors would be dicta. In introducing its discussion of the responsibility of non-military superiors, the
court says that it "deems it appropriate to first set out its reasoning [on command responsibility for]
persons in non-military positions of authority." Id. para. 355.
166. Id. para. 377.
167. Id. para. 378.
168. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 368-69. The authors further explain the
nuance between a military commander and a civilian operating as a military commander:
[A] distinction has to be made between the commander-in-chief, who may be a civilian,
and other civilians who may be in the military chain of command and who have effective
command and control responsibilities. The difference is essentially of an evidentiary
nature. Thus, a commander-in-chief, despite the title, may fail to exercise the full powers
of the office. Conversely, a civilian who occupy [sic] a position of military command and
control may make decisions on strategic or tactical matters or both.
Id. at 368.
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relies on to establish civilians as "superiors." 169 However, in fairness to the
court, most of these cases were from the post-World War II era, and many of
these cases, as noted above, have been criticized since as "victors' justice."
170
This section has explored the superior-subordinate relationship element
from the perspective of both a military commander and a civilian superior,
pursuant to articles 28(1) and 28(2) of the Statute respectively. 171 Another
169. For example, the defendant in the Roeehling case, which the Celebici court discussed,
Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 361-63, 376, 389, was an industrialist, and his command and control
structure existed in an industrial setting rather than a military command structure, yet the Roechling
court held him accountable under a command responsibility theory. See infra Section V.B (analyzing the
Roechling case).
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1), (2). Up to this stage, this Article has suggested that
the ICC Statute's bifurcated command responsibility provision may lessen the efficacy of the ICC
command responsibility doctrine, especially with regard to civilians. However, a counter-hypothesis
should be considered: that the ICC approach actually expands the civilian command responsibility
doctrine. This argument would require several steps.
First, one would accept that a dispute exists as to whether prior customary law contained a lesser
standard for civilians. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. Second, one would assume that
the Celebici holding, that civilian superiors are "superiors" only to the extent that they operate as
military commanders, reflects the current state of international customary law, or that it will reflect the
future state of international customary law despite the absence of this requirement in the ICC Siatute.
Third, if the Celebici holding is taken textually, it can be read to be coextensive with the clause in article
28(1) of the ICC Statute, which states: "or person effectively acting as a military commander." Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1). Adding up the steps, one would argue that before the ICC Statute the
command responsibility status of civilian superiors was ambiguous, or was at best coextensive with
military commanders when acting similar to a military commander. Having argued this interpretation of
the prior law, one can plausibly contend that the explicit codification of command responsibility for
civilian superiors removes the ambiguity of the prior law and explicitly expands the ICC Statute's reach
over civilian superiors who commit human rights atrocities.
There are several persuasive counter-arguments to the hypothesis that the new civilian provisions
expand the reach of the command responsibility doctrine. First, despite their deficiencies, the post-
World War H precedents are always available as persuasive authority and these courts held civilian
superiors accountable using the command responsibility doctrine. In some of these cases, civilians were
accountable under a command responsibility theory in situations where the civilian's control over his or
her subordinates was not military-like. See infra Sections V.A and V.B. These cases are of tremendous
historical value beyond their legal meaning, and in similar circumstances future courts would likely look
to them and to the scholarly work analyzing these post-World War H cases. See generally, BASSIOUNI &
MANIKAS, supra note 16; LAEL, supra note 108; MNEAR, supra note 100; PICCIGALLO, supra note 100;
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6; ROLING, supra note 100; Bassiouni, supra note 4; Cassel, supra note
9; Green, supra note 68; Landrum, supra note 113; Parks, supra note 38. Second, one could attack the
assumption that Celebici is the best evidence of civilian command responsibility. Normally,
international treaties are better evidence of the state of customary international law than judicial
decisions. If it goes into effect, the Rome Treaty will have gathered the signatures of sixty nations. One
basis of international law is the consent of states, see Payam Akhavan, The Dilemmas of Jurisprudence,
in The Contribution of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to the International Humanitarian Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
R v. 1509, 1519 (1998), and the ratification of a treaty by sixty nations acts as a stronger signal about
the level ofconsent among states than a single court holding.
Third, the Celebici holding on the superior-subordinate relationship element, that the control
must be military-like for command responsibility to apply to civilians, may not represent current
customary international law; in discussing the knowledge element of the ICTY Statute, the Celebici
court explicitly states that it makes no holding as to the present content of customary international law.
See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 393. Additionally, as the Celebici court concedes, the ICTY command
responsibility provision specifically uses a word of broad meaning, "superior," to indicate which
individuals fall under the command responsibility doctrine. Id. paras. 356-57. It violates the plain
meaning of the use of this term to restrict its scope of coverage by insisting that it apply only to
superiors with military-like control.
Finally, regardless of the type of control necessary to satisfy the knowledge element, the
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perspective arises from a sub-element of article 28, the "crimes concerned
activities" nexus element of article 28(2)(b). The next section discusses this
component of the ICC Statute's civilian command responsibility standard
because it affects the superior-subordinate relationship element. This nexus
sub-element may further codify a less strict civilian command responsibility
standard, or it may simply express the common-sense requirement that before
a civilian superior can be found to have criminally neglected his or her duty to
control subordinates, the authority to control them must pre-exist.
3. The New "Crimes Concerned Activities" Nexus Element in Article
28(2)(b) of the ICC Statute
Article 28(2), the ICC Statute's civilian command responsibility
standard, has a sub-element that requires that the subordinates' crimes must
"[concern] activities that were within the effective responsibility and control
of the superior."' 72 This sub-element is not present in the ICC Statute's
military command responsibility provision, raising the question of its purpose
in the civilian standard. One potential explanation of article 28(2)(b), the
"crimes concerned" provision, is that it implicitly embodies a causation
element. This suggestion arises from the defense's causation argument in the
Celebici case, which the court rejected insofar as it applies to superior
responsibility. 73 The defense in Celebici argued that the prosecution must
prove that the superior's failure directly caused each violation. The court
"found no support for the existence of a requirement of proof of causation as a
separate element of superior responsibility." 174 While rejecting causation as a
separate element, the court hedged a bit by implying that a causal nexus may
be necessary for proof of the inaction element.
1 -5
The problem with this proffered explanation is that the language of
article 28(2)(b), "crimes concerned activities," does not seem fully to express
the idea of causation. First, "concerned," means "relating to, pertaining to,
affecting, involving, being substantially engaged in or taking part in."176 Only
the word "affecting" connotes traditional criminal causation. This definition of
potential new nexus element of article 28(2)(b), "crimes concerned activities," gives defense counsel an
additional weapon. The textual formatting suggests that this provision is a new element because it is
listed at the same outline level as the knowledge and inaction elements. Thus, if it is an additional
element, defense counsel can vigorously advocate that the prosecutor must prove this new element in its
entirety, despite its conceptual overtones with the superior-subordinate relationship element.
172. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2)(b).
173. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 396-400.
174. Id. para. 398. The court noted, however, one exception that did support a causation
element. The exception the court noted is from a commentator who, "[a]s part of his analysis of the
requirement that the superior has failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or
punish the crimes of his subordinates.... suggests the existence of causation as 'the essential element'
in cases of command responsibility." Id. para. 398 n.428 (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 350 (1996)).
175. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 399 ("In fact, a recognition of a necessary causal nexus
may be considered to be inherent in the requirement of crimes committed by subordinates and the
superior's failure to take measures within his powers to prevent them.").
176. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 289(6th ed. 1990).
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"concerned" seems to pull the meaning of article 28(2)(b) under the superior-
subordinate relationship, specifically under the fairness concern that the
superior actually have authority over, or be able to control, the subordinates'
actions for which the superior might be criminally liable.
Second, one can argue that article 28(2)(b) simply states the obvious,
that civilian superiors do not have the same kind of around-the-clock, seven-
days-a-week control over subordinates that military commanders have. Under
this argument, article 28(2)(b) is not a causation element, but is a mere
recognition of the nature of civilian authority. However, under this
interpretation, article 28(2)(b) might be superfluous because the scope of the
superior-subordinate relationship is articulated in both articles 28(1) and
28(2). Courts are hesitant to construe a portion of a statute as superfluous;
thus, it is unlikely that article 28(2)(b) would be taken as a mere statement of
the differences between civilian control and military control. Consequently,
while article 28(2)(b) may not express causation, its actual meaning will
remain unclear until construed by the ICC.
This completes the discussion of the superior-subordinate relationship
element as expressed by the ICC Statute's command responsibility provision.
Next, Section IV.C discusses the knowledge element, which contains the most
profound changes between the ICC Statute's military and civilian standard. It
gives a civilian superior less reason to be diligent because he or she has more
legal room to remain willfully blind to the unlawful actions of subordinates.
C. The Knowledge Element
1. The Text of the ICC Statute
Article 28(l)(a) says that a military commander is criminally responsible
for crimes of subordinates under his or her effective control when the
commander "knew, or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have
known," about the actual or impending crime. 177 In contrast, article 28(2)(a)
requires that the civilian superior "either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit the crime.178 The civilian formulation sets an easier standard
for the accused to exonerate himself or herself via the knowledge element.
2. Celebici on the Knowledge Element
The clear difference in language between "consciously disregarded," and
"owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known," makes it
unnecessary for this Article to split hairs on the knowledge standard as the
Celebici court did. It analyzed the ICTY Statute knowledge element in two
parts: (1) actual knowledge, "knew;" and (2) "had reason to know."'179 Also,
177. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(a).
178. Id. art. 28(2)(a).
179. Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 383-84, 387.
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the Celebici court was clearly aware of the ICC Statute.180 With respect to
actual knowledge, the Celebici court rejected the prosecutors' proffered
"Yamashita-like" presumption that a commander's knowledge of the crimes
can be presumed.' 1 The court held that actual knowledge cannot be presumed
but, in the absence of direct evidence of superior knowledge, can be inferred
from circumstantial evidence.182 The Celebici court went on to list twelve
factors that can infonn the inference.183 Thus, actual knowledge can be
"established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that [a superior's]
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes.,
184
With respect to the "had reason to know" standard, the court
acknowledged that willful blindness is criminal, and then was careful to
distinguish the ICTY standard, "knew or had reason to know," from "should
have known." In this area the court was carefully respecting these minute
differences in language because of the rejected "should have known"
formulations offered during the negotiations over Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. 185 The court held that the following standard reflected
the practice of customary law at the time of the indictment of the Celebici
defendants, and was accordingly the mens rea standard for article 7(3) of the
ICTY Statute:
[A] superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific information was in
fact available to him which would provide notice of offences committed by his
subordinates. This information need not be such that it by itself was sufficient to compel
the conclusion of the existence of such crimes. It is sufficient that the superior was put on
further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated the need for
additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed or
about to be committed by his subordinates.
18 6
Thus, under this standard, a superior may possess the mens rea for
criminal liability when "he had in his possession information of a nature,
which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offenses by
indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether
180. The Celebici court noted the new ICC civilian knowledge standard. See id. para. 393
n.424.
181. See id. para. 384. The court justified rejecting the presumption as follows:
[T]he Prosecution asserts the existence of a rule of presumption where the crimes of
subordinates are a matter of public notoriety, are numerous, occur over a prolonged
period, or over a wide geographical area. However, the legal authorities cited by the
Prosecution in this regard are insufficient to support the operation of such a rule. Among
the cases relied upon by the Prosecution in this respect is that of General Yamashita. An
examination of the findings of the Military Commission however, does not bear out this
claim. In fact, the nature of the mens rea ascribed to General Yamashita in that case is not
immediately apparent from the Commission's decision.
Id.
182. See id. para. 386.
183. Seeid.
184. Id. para. 383.
185. See Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and 11 to the Geneva Conventions, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Crowe, supra note 116, at 224-25; supra
notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
186. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 393.
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such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his
subordinates."
1 87
The court then made several statements that seem to indicate the court
believed that the ICC Statute may change the state of international customary
law. The court expressly said that it "makes no finding as to the present
content of customary law on this point., 188 Then, the court paraphrased the
ICC Statute, stating that the ICC Statute makes a commander criminally
responsible where he knew or should have known of offenses. 189 If this were
the exact language of the ICC Statute, then, given the amendment history of
Protocol I, this might signal a significant change in the command
responsibility mens rea standard. However, the Celebici court failed to
mention the modifying clause "owing to the circumstances at the time,"
immediately preceding the phrase "should have known" in the ICC Statute.
This clause would make a substantial difference and probably makes the ICC
standard closer to the ICTY standard than to the mythical "should have
known" standard.19
The concern about whether "had reason to know" is different from
"owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known," will be an
important issue when article 28(l)(a) is construed by the ICC. But to compare
article 28(1) to article 28(2), such precise analysis of the knowledge standard
is unnecessary because the civilian knowledge standard is unambiguously less
strict. The following table illustrates the point.191
187. Id. para. 383.
188. Id. para. 393.
189. See id.
190. While this observation of the Celebici court's omission does not impact the primary focus
of this Article, it does illustrate the scholarly following of such details. Many of the articles cited herein
would interpret a "should have known" standard along the lines of the Yamashita precedent. See, e.g.,
Crowe, supra note 116, at 229. At most, my interpretation of the actual ICC standard is that it simply
lets in more types of information as evidence to impute knowledge to the defendant, that is, to the extent
that circumstances in the ICC is broader than information in Protocol I.
Also, to the extent that the ICC military standard reflects the second formulation rejected for
Protocol I, "knew or should reasonably have known in the circumstances at the time," this supports the
Celebici court's view that the ICC military formulation might extend liability. See supra notes 184-186
and accompanying text.
191. The only clauses cited in this table are those clauses that are not cited elsewhere in this
Article.
2000] Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the ICC 123
TABLE 1 - LANGUAGE OF MENS REA FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ELEMENT OF
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Most Strict ) Least Strict
Mythical "Yamashita" Candidates for the Current International Law The New ICC Civilian
Standard(s) Standard Standard
Strict Liability: ICC Military: ICC Non-Military:
no mens rea. knew, or, owing to the circumstances at the knew or consciously
time, should have known, disregarded information
Rejected for Protocol I: which clearly indicated.
(a) knew or should have ICTY & ICTR
known; knew or had reason to know.
(b) knew or should Accepted for Protocol I:
reasonably have known knew or had information which should have
in the circumstances at enabled them to conclude in the
the time. circumstances at the time.
U.S. Army Field Manual:
has actual knowledge, or should have
knowledge, through reports received by him
or through other means.' 92
As shown, the ICC civilian standard is sufficiently distinct from the
language of the previous standards and from the ICC military standard so that
it is unlikely that a court will construe them to be equivalent. Even though the
ICC military standard is listed in the middle column, the table also shows that
the status of the ICC military standard is open to debate. 193 One can argue that
the ICC military standard is more strict than the Additional Protocol I standard
because its language is nearly identical to the second formulation rejected for
Protocol I.
The discussion of Subsections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2 shows that the ICC
civilian standard is textually different from the ICC military standard and the
other military standards, and therefore, deserves closer evaluation. The next
section does this by discussing the effect of the civilian standard on a
superior's duty to remain informed of the subordinate's activities, and how
this effect manifests itself in the evidentiary setting of the court room.
3. The "Consciously Disregarded" Standard in the Knowledge Element
in Article 28(2)(a) of the ICC Statute
The new civilian knowledge standard suggests a significantly lessened
duty of the civilian superior, compared to the military commander, to remain
informed of events within the superior's domain. The ICTY standard, "knew
or had reason to know," implies that the superior or commander meets the
knowledge requirement when he or she has enough information to conclude
192. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 501, at 178-
79 (1956), quoted in Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 15
(1972).
193. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 366 ("National courts, however, have set
different legal tests ranging from 'could have known' to 'having actual knowledge.'").
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that the crimes are occurring or have occurred. 194 "Consciously disregarded"
may go much further, and perhaps represents the "willful blindness" that the
Celebici court said was actionable.19 The word "consciously" means being
"well aware of some object, impression, or truth." 196 The Celebici court said
willful blindness is when a superior "simply ignores information within his
actual possession compelling the conclusion that criminal offenses are being
committed or about to be committed." 197 Given these meanings, the most
important question about the "consciously disregarded" standard is whether it
reduces the superior's duty, from a criminal liability perspective, to remain
informed. If the duty remains at the same level, and is subject to the same
scrutiny, then the superior should be receiving the same reports, information,
and communications from subordinates. 19 If the duty remains the same, the
difference between article 28(l)(a) and 28(2)(a) is perhaps not as great as it
could be. The degree of difference then turns on the loosening of the standard
implied by the new phrase "consciously disregard."
On the other hand, if the ICC construes article 28(2)(a) to lessen the duty
of the superior to stay informed, this would change the evidence available at
trial because superiors might systematically "fail to acquire such
knowledge." 199 In the long run, even a marginal reduction in the superior's
duty could have a more significant impact on prosecutions than the loosening
of the knowledge imputation standard from "owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known," to "consciously disregarded information that
clearly indicated." While damaging to the efficacy of the court, this loosening
is less damaging than a lowered duty for purposes of command responsibility.
With a lowered duty, there could be less evidence available. With the same
level of duty, but a "consciously disregarded" standard, the court would have
to decide two questions: (1) whether the superior's actions embody a choice to
turn away from the information, and (2) whether the information was clear
about the fact that crimes were occurring or about to occur. Under the ICTY
Statute, the court has to evaluate these same two questions to decide whether
the defendant "had reason to know." Thus, there are similarities, but under the
ICC text the evidentiary burden will likely be higher for the prosecutor when
the defendant is a civilian superior.
This part has thus analyzed the ICC Statute from the perspective of the
two most relevant elements of the command responsibility doctrine. With this
appreciation of the contours of article 28, Part V applies article 28 to the fact
patterns of various civilian defendants from past cases.
194. See Crowe, supra note 116, at 229-31.
195. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 387.
196. NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 277 (Funk & Wagnalls
comprehensive ed. 1995).
197. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 387.
198. A lowered duty to remain informed would take the force out of the Roechling court's
holding that "no superior may prefer this [lack of knowledge] defense indefinitely; for it is his duty to
know what occurs in his organization, and lack of knowledge, therefore, can only be the result of
criminal negligence." Roechling, supra note 29, at 1106.
199. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 388.
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V. PRIOR CASES RE-EVALUATED UNDER THE ICC STATUTE'S COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARD
A. The Tokyo Trials and the Hirota Case
The Tokyo trials of the IMT-FE indicted "28 Japanese, who had all, with
two exceptions, occupied the highest government and military posts at
sometime between 1928 and 1945. ' 'z°0 One commentator characterized the
Tokyo trials as "the greatest inquisition of political leaders by their foreign
enemies that we have seen in this century; that is both its glory and its
infamy. 20 1 K6ki Hirota, a diplomat and a civilian, was one of the
defendants.2 °2 The IMT-FE found Hirota guilty on Count 55,203 a command-
responsibility-like provision.204 Hirota had been foreign minister of Japan
from 1933-36, served a short stint as prime minister, and was again foreign
minister in 1937-38.205 During Hirota's second term as foreign minister,
Japan's army was invading China and the Japanese army committed atrocities
over a seven-week period in and around the city of Nanking.
20 6
Hirota had received reports of these atrocities.207 When the Japanese
took control of Nanking they simultaneously established an embassy with a
line of authority traced to Hirota:
Japanese Embassy officials entered the city of Nanking with the advance elements of the
Army, and an official of the Embassy informed the International Committee for the
Nanking Safety Zone that the "Army was determined to make it bad for Nanking, but that
200. PICCIGALLO, supra note 100, at 14; see also 1 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29,
at 686-804.
201. 1 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at xxxi.
202. See id. at 21-75.
203. See 20 id. at 49,792. The judgment of the court characterizes the situation at Nanking as
follows below:
Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering,
raping, looting and burning. There was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were
drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese men, women
and children without apparent provocation or excuse until in places the streets and alleys
were littered with the bodies of their victims.... Chinese were hunted like rabbits,
everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non-combat Chinese men, women and
children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings during the first two or three days
of the Japanese occupation of the city.
There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest
resistance on the part of a victim or the members of her family who sought to protect her.
Even girls of tender years and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the
city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behavior in connection with these rapes
occurred. Many women were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated.
Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city during the first month of the
occupation.
Id. at 49,604-06.
204. See lid. at 70-71; MINEAR, supra note 100, at 67 (noting that the defendants at the Tokyo
trial "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the
observance and prevent breaches [of the laws of war].").
205. See 20 ToKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 49,788.
206. See id. at 49,604-10.
207. Seeid.at49,610-11;2 id. at2661.
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the Embassy officials were going to try to moderate the action."
208
Many of the atrocities occurred at the University of Nanking, which was
located next to the Japanese Embassy,20 9 making it plain that Japanese
officials at the embassy "were aware of the deplorable situation."2 '0 Hirota
discussed the reports with the Japanese War Ministry, but he accepted
"assurances" from the War Ministry that the problem would be corrected
despite continuing reports.211 The IMT-FE found this behavior to be a
dereliction of duty and criminal negligence. 12 Hirota was also found guilty of
conspiracy to commit aggression and waging a war of aggression against
China.2 13 For all these crimes he was sentenced to death.214
Had Hirota's case been evaluated under the ICC civilian command
responsibility standard, he likely would escape the Count 55 charge. There is
no evidence that Hirota, as foreign minister, was a person "effectively acting
as a military commander"215 with respect to the troops who committed
atrocities at the "Rape of Nanking." Thus, Hirota would fall under ICC article
28(2). Considering first the superior-subordinate relationship element, article
28(2) would likely exonerate Hirota because these atrocities were probably
not "committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and
control.2 6 The Japanese army committed the crimes, and unless Hirota's
embassy had some authority, control, or significant influence over these
troops, it is unlikely that the superior-subordinate relationship element would
be satisfied.217
208. 20 id. at 49,608-11.
209. See 2 id. at 2638; ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 179-81 (1987).
210. BRACKMAN, supra note 209, at 180.
211. See 20 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 49,791; MINEAR, supra note 100, at
71.
212. See 20 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 49,791. The court characterized
Hirota's criminal lapse as follows:
Hirota was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the cabinet that immediate action be
taken to put an end to the atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about
the same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being
implemented while hundreds of murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were
being committed daily. His inaction amounted to criminal negligence.
Id. (emphasis added).
213. See 1 TOKYO TRIALTRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 27,33; 20 id. at 49,792.
214. See 20 id. at 49,855; BRACKMAN, supra note 209, at 378-84.
215. 20 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 49,788-92.
216. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2).
217. The difficulty of reconciling Hirota's apparent lack of control over the atrocity-
committing individuals with his conviction explains the scholarly objection to the command
responsibility aspect of his case. See MINFAR, supra note 100, at 69-73. The court declared that Hirota
should have "insisted before the cabinet" that something be done, 20 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra
note 29, at 49,791, which means that the court must have believed that Hirota, at some level, had
authority and influence to apply to the situation. Hirota's prior tenure as prime minister might support
this theory.
Taking a different perspective, the IMT-FE may have been transparently applying the concept of
de jure authority developed by the court in the Celebici case. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 354
("The mere absence of formal legal authority to control the actions of subordinates should therefore not
be understood to preclude the imposition of such responsibility.").
A third perspective on the case is that Hirota was held culpable on the command responsibility
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Second, Hirota would probably be found not culpable on the knowledge
element of the ICC Statute, article 28(2)(a), because he did not "consciously
disregard[] information which clearly indicated" the atrocities. The
information was clear enough for Hirota to act on it. In addition, the fact that
he acted by raising the issue with the War Ministry shows that he did not
consciously disregard it. However, one could counter-argue that later, after the
"assurances," Hirota did consciously disregard the continuing reports.2 18
Under the ICC Statute, if Hirota had reacted to the reports to the extent of his
power and influence, in a timely manner, and reacted to each report as it came
in, then it would be difficult to claim that he consciously disregarded the
information.
Returning to the superior-subordinate relationship element, this
discussion adds a hypothetical fact to the Hirota case to evaluate article
28(2)(b): the ICC's new nexus element. Consider that Hirota likely had
civilian foreign service employees in the city of Nanking at the Japanese
Embassy. Add the hypothetical fact that some of these employees were
participating in atrocities after their work hours. As required by
article 28(2)(b), would these crimes "concern" the subordinates' activities
under Hirota's control? In this hypothetical, defense counsel might be able to
use article 28(2)(b) to exonerate Hirota because the employees committed the
criminal activities during off-duty hours. With all other elements being equal,
a civilian superior might be exonerated where a military commander running
the same institution in the Nanking area staffed with military personnel would
be held liable.
The discussion of the Hirota case raises one of the primary concerns
with the bifurcated ICC command responsibility standard: that it privileges
form over function. Status-based determinations are often highly fact specific,
and a wide range of potential defendants will surely plead that they fall
outside the confines of article 28(2). In an era of loose, paramilitary
organizations practicing terrorism and guerrilla warfare, the difficulties of a
status-based, bifurcated standard seem especially pronounced.219
count primarily on the inaction element because the court specifically found his attempts to protest the
atrocities insufficient. See 20 TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 49,791. If Hirota was
convicted on Count 55 primarily due to the inaction element, one way to explain the court's laxity with
respect to the superior-subordinate relationship element is that the court assumed that this element was
met due to Hirota's conviction on the direct command responsibility counts.
218. See id. ("Reports of atrocities continued to come in for at least a month.").
219. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 129. These authors elaborate on the difficulties
raised by paramilitary groups:
[A]s a practical matter, the extension of culpability under command responsibility raises
special questions in the context of organizations without rigid military hierarchies.
Prosecutors will need to determine the chain of command in the absence of clear rank or
even formal decision-making structures. Reliance will need to be placed on witness
testimony and other indicia of the customary practices observed within a particular group.
Id. at 129.
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B. The Nuremberg Trials and the Roechling Case
To further explore the effect of the ICC civilian command responsibility
standard, this section applies the facts of the Roechling2 0 case to these
provisions. Hermann Roechling was a German steel industry executive who
owned or operated various production facilities before World War 11.221 As the
Third Reich expanded, he supervised and improved steel production in the
occupied countries and began taking advantage of compelled labor from the
citizens of these occupied countries to operate the factories. 222 Some of the
factories using prison labor existed symbiotically with military prison camps• 223
where the workers were systematically mistreated.
A French military tribunal tried Hermann Roechling and several others
for various counts. The counts against Roechling included: (1) preparing to
undertake a war of aggression; (2) undertaking aggressive war; and (3)
mistreatment of workers supplied by the German armed forces and state
police. The French court analyzed the first two counts under a "direct"
command responsibility or direct participation standard.224 Our task below is
to analyze the facts underlying each count against the ICC Statute's command
responsibility standard, assuming that all three counts were brought using the
command responsibility doctrine.
1. The "Preparing To Undertake a War ofAggression " Count
The first count would have the same outcome under the ICC Statute as
in the actual Roechling case. The French superior military court affirmed the
general tribunal's 225 holding that merely using low-grade ore in steel
220. The Roechling case was reported along with the Nuremberg military trials by the U.S.
Government printing office because many U.S. court cases cited it. The Celebici court cites and analyzes
the Roechling case in its holding that civilian leaders can be liable under command responsibility with
mere de facto control and influence:
[Tihe Roechling case is best construed as an example of the imposition of superior
responsibility on the basis of de facto powers of control possessed by civilian industrial
leaders. While the accused in this case were found guilty, inter alia, of failing to take
action against the abuse of forced labourers committed by the members of the Gestapo, it
is nowhere suggested that the accused had any formal authority to issue orders to
personnel under Gestapo command. Instead, the judgement employs the wording
"sufficient" authority, a term not normally used in relation to formal powers of command,
but rather one used to describe a degree of (informal) influence. This view is further
supported by the reasoning employed in the judgement of the court of first instance in
this case, which, in response to the claim of one of the accused that he could not give
orders to the plant police and the personnel of a punishment camp, as these were under
the orders of the Gestapo, makes reference to his status as Hermann Roechling's son-in-
law-clearly a source of no more than de facto influence-as a factor affecting his
authority to obtain an alleviation in the treatment of workers by the plant police.
Celebici, supra note 20, para. 376 (citations omitted).
221. See Roechling, supra note 29, at 1077-79, 1086-89, 1112-13.
222. See id. at 1079, 1086.
223. See id. at 1087-89.
224. See id. at 1061, 1077-78.
225. The superior court is the appellate court. See id. at 1097. The general tribunal is the trial
court. See id. at 1061.
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production was not sufficient evidence to conclude that Roechling participated
in "preparations for aggressive war., 226 Factually, at issue was whether
Roechling knew of the preparations, due to his attendance at several secret
conferences with Goering and others in 1936 and 1937.227 Roechling asserted
that he did not know, and that the discussion at the conferences concerned
reviving the German economy. 228 Focusing only on the knowledge element,
under these facts and the ICC civilian standard of knowledge, "knew or
consciously disregarded," Roechling would likely be exonerated. There was
no evidence that Roechling ever had any information to "consciously
disregard" and in this pre-war period it seems logical that, as an industrialist,
he would attend such conferences for other purposes. The Roechling court
seemed unwilling to impute to Roechling the knowledge of preparing for
aggressive war from Roechling's knowing use of uneconomical, low-grade
ore to raise steel production. While the inference is perhaps not so illogical, to
the court's credit, there are also other plausible explanations for using low-
grade ore.
With respect to the new nexus element, Roechling's subordinates'
activities probably would be crimes that concerned these activities, but this
conclusion flows primarily from the very wide net cast by the broad crime of
"preparing for aggressive war." If steel production is adjudged to be
punishable under this broad crime, the nexus element is probably met because
merely producing excess steel becomes the basis for the crime.
2. The "Undertaking a War ofAggression " Count
In the second count, conducting aggressive war, Roechling would likely
be exonerated under the ICC civilian standard. The Roechling superior court
also exonerated Roechling on this count2 29 after the General Tribunal let the
count stand.230 The count arose from Roechling's managerial role, once the
war was underway, with respect to his steel conglomerate in Germany and
steel production facilities in occupied countries.231 As in the first count,
whether Roechling would meet the new ICC civilian nexus element depends
in large part on the breadth of the definition of "conducting a war of
aggression., 232 The ICC civilian knowledge element is again likely to
exonerate Roechling if the facts of this count were applied to command
responsibility liability. Roechling can easily claim that he was merely
producing steel. To meet the "consciously disregard" standard, a prosecutor
would have to show both that (1) concrete information was presented to
226. Id. at 1108.
227. See id. at 1077.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1140.
230. See id. at 1079.
231. See id. ("[D]ue to his talents as technician and also to the pressure which he exercised over
the industry of occupied countries, Hermann Roechling was able to eliminate the drop in ferrous
production.').
232. Id. at 1076.
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Roechling informing him that his company's activities were a part of
"undertaking a war of aggression," and (2) that Roechling chose to remain
willfully blind to this information. With this high hurdle, Roechling would be
exonerated unless, following the heritage of the Yamashita and Hirota cases,
the ICC adopted a presumption of such knowledge when the activities are
widespread.2 3 However, judging from the Celebici court's holding, adoption
of such a presumption is unlikely.234 Finally, even with the presumption of
exposure to "information that clearly indicated," a prosecutor still would
likely have to prove that Roechling chose to "consciously disregard" the
information. Thus, the knowledge element of the ICC civilian standard is a
significant barrier to prosecution of industrialists like Roechling who
participate in conducting a war of aggression.
3. The "Mistreating Workers" Count
In the third count, mistreating workers,235 Roechling would likely be
exonerated under the ICC Statute even though the French court held, under a
command responsibility theory, that he was guilty.236 As a preliminary matter,
Roechling was also found guilty of direct participation in commandeering
civilians from occupied countries to work in the steel factories on the basis of
his requests to the armed forces for more workers.237 On the primary count,
mistreating workers, at the trial level, the French court recognized that the
basis of Roechling's liability was not from "having ordered this abominable
treatment but of having tolerated it and of not having done anything in order
to have [the treatment] modified. ' 38 In affirming the judgment, the superior
233. See Crowe, supra note 116, at 200, 203. Crowe notes:
Nevertheless, where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread
offenses and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the
lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding
them.
Id. (citations omitted).
234. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 385-86.
235. See Roechling, supra note 29, at 1125.
236. Seeid. at1134.
237. See id. at 1085, 1128-34. However, the requests for more workers occurred because the
German armed forces had initially established the practice of supplying workers for the factory.
Additionally, both courts also found Roechling guilty of plunder. See id. at 1095-96, 1140.
238. Id. at 1088. In addition to the superior court's recognition that the liability arose from the
dereliction of duty, the trial court also commented in depth concerning Roechling's neglect of his duty
to ensure the wellbeing of workers:
[I]t was his duty as the head to inquire into the treatment accorded to the foreign workers
and to the prisoners of war whose employment in his war plants was, moreover,
forbidden by the rules of warfare, of which fact he must have been aware; that he cannot
escape his responsibility by stating that the question had no interest for him; that his
double position as chief of an important industry and as president of the RVE would have
given him the necessary authority to bring about changes in the inhuman treatment of
these workers; that witnesses have stated that at several times he had the opportunity to
ascertain what the condition of his personnel was during his visits to the plants; that he
himself states that he came in contact with these men from Voelklingen, particularly with
the internees from Etzenhofen, who were recognizable by the prison garb, but that he had
never considered the condition of their existence, although their miserable situation was
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court recognized that Roechling was "not accused of having ordered this
horrible treatment, but of having permitted it; and indeed supported it, and in
addition, of not having done [his] utmost to put an end to these abuses.,
23 9
The superior court rejected Roechling's contention that he was not concerned
with "manpower matters."
240
Under the ICC Statute's new nexus requirement in article 28(2)(b),
Roechling's liability would turn on whether the mistreatment occurred at the
factory or at the nearby camp. Because the armed forces and the SS originally
supplied the workers, the SS retained significant aspects of control over the
workers.241 Specifically, at one plant under Roechling's corporate umbrella,
the SS established a nearby punishment camp.242 Workers who violated
various regulations and ordinances were housed in the camp, but transported
each day to the factory to work.243 This fact raises the question of whether
Roechling would be held liable under ICC command responsibility for
mistreatment at both the factory and the camps. The Roechling court held the
defendant liable for mistreatment at both locations. 244 Presumably, under ICC
article 28(2)(b), mistreatment at the factory is a "crime concerned" with the
activities that Roechling was ultimately responsible for as a manager.
However, at the camp, the new ICC nexus requirement would likely shield
Roechling from liability for mistreatment, despite the symbiotic relationship
between the plant and the factory.245 Mistreatment at the plant is not a crime
concerning any activities under Roechling's control because the SS ran the
punishment camp. Without this new nexus requirement, Roechling might be
held liable because workers were subjected to camp punishment because of
their original infractions at the factory.
246
Under the "consciously disregarded" knowledge element standard of the
ICC Statute, Roechling would probably escape liability where the Roechling
apparent to all those who passed them on the street.
Id. at 1088-89.
239. Id. at 1136.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 1135.
242. See id.
243. See id. The manager of this plant, one of the other defendants, "participated, on [his] own
initiative, in the implementation of strict measures as prescribed in the regulations and ordinances of the
Reich administration for the maintenance of working discipline and repeatedly took the initiative in a
manner which exhibits conformity with the views, aims, and measures of that administration." Id. at
1134.
244. Seeid.at 1135.
245. The court described the relationship between the factory and the camp as follows:
In April 1943, following an agreement between the leaders of the Roechling firm and the
Gestapo, a summary court was set up to punish disciplinary offenses by the foreign
workers, such as repeated absence, repeated tardiness, stoppage of work, refusal to
perform additional work, [and] undisciplined conduct. At the same time a punishment
camp was set up about 15 kilometers away at Etzenhofen, by agreement between the
leaders of the Roechling finn and the Gestapo, to which the foreigners sentenced by the
summary court were to be consigned for a maximum period of 56 days. The persons
undergoing sentence who spent the night in Etzenhofen were taken to the Roechling plant
in the morning and back to the camp at night.
Id. at 1135.
246. See id.
132 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25: 89
court found liability.247 The prosecution would have to prove an affirmative
action by Roechling that directly enabled him to avoid information concerning
the crimes. Roechling claimed to know nothing of the mistreatment or poor
conditions at the factory.248 Some witnesses testified to the contrary.249 Even if
Roechling inspected the factory at issue, he still could avoid liability under the
"consciously disregarded" standard unless the prosecution had some evidence
that showed that Roechling adopted a particular factory tour route or declined
to inspect certain areas. The local plant manager has it in his interest to show
Roechling that the plant is running well, so a "sprucing-up" before inspection
by local plant management would likely exonerate Roechling under a
"consciously disregarded" standard. Thus, the new knowledge element
significantly enhances a defendant's ability to escape liability through
delegation and shielding information, so long as the shielding or filtering of
upward-flowing information has some justification other than as a mechanism
for the manager to remain willfully blind. In contrast, under a "had reason to
know," or even a "should have known" standard, a court can more readily
conduct a factual balancing as to the genuineness of the managers' efforts to
stay informed.
Section V.B has recast the facts underlying three of the counts against
Roechling onto article 28(2) of the ICC Statute. The recasting shows that the
less strict standard can significantly impact case outcomes, and therefore the
new ICC civilian standard lessens the permanent court's ability to reach those
individuals who are behind an organized movement that produces serious
violations of human rights.
C. The ICTR and the Akayesu Case
1. Is There a "Split of Authority" on Civilian Command
Responsibility?
In the case of Akayesu, the ICTR declined to state a general rule that the
command responsibility doctrine applies to civilians. Mr. Akayesu was
elected major of a town in Rwanda approximately a year before the genocide
of the Tutsi people.251 The local militia committed abuses against displaced
Tutsis taking refuge in the town. 2 2 One of the main disputes in the case was
247. See id. at 1134.
248. See id. at 1133. Roechling stated that he was "forced to employ the forced workers who
were placed at their disposal." Id. at 1113.
249. See id. at 1136 ("Roechling [had] repeated opportunities during the inspection of his
concerns to ascertain the fate meted out to his personnel, since he could not fail to notice the prisoners'
uniform[s on those occasions [ofa plant visit].").
250. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 6.2. Quoting the commentary to Additional Protocol I, the
court expressed that there are many "varying views regarding the Mens rea requirement for command
responsibility." Id.
251. See Summary of the Judgment in the Jean-Paul Akayesu Case, paras. 9-11, (visited Nov.
5, 1999) <http://www.un.orglictrlenglist/singledocsjpasummary.html> [hereinafter Akayesu
Summary].
252. See id. para. 11.
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whether Mr. Akayesu had authority and control over this local militia.253 The
Akayesu court analyzed the Hirota case from the IMT-FE trials. The court
cited Judge R6Iing's dissent, which expressed concern with holding
government officials responsible for the behavior of the army.254 The Akayesu
court then found that "command responsibility for civilians remains
contentious," therefore, the ICTR should evaluate civilians on a case by case
basis to be sure that the "power of authority actually devolved upon the
[civilian] ... to take all necessary and reasonable measures" to prevent or
punish the crimes.2 55
Thus, compared to the court in Celebici, the Akayesu court articulated a
significantly reduced scope of civilian command responsibility. As the only
two modem international criminal tribunals to speak on the subject, the
courts' differences on the scope of civilian command responsibility are
significant enough to be characterized as a "split of authority." In Celebici, the
ICTY held unequivocally that command responsibility "extends not only to
military commanders but also to individuals in non-military positions of
superior authority, ',256 even though it later limited its statement to civilian
superiors who exercise subordinate control similar to that of military
commanders. 7
These two courts, working from nearly identical and substantively
equivalent statutory language, construed significantly different default
positions for the scope of the command responsibility doctrine for civilians.
Reading the opinions side by side, on the civilian command responsibility
issue the Celebici case seems better reasoned because it draws on a balanced
set of sources to evidence customary international law; whereas the ICTR
court reasons from one judge's dissent in a post-World War II case.25 8 These
conflicting views of the scope of command responsibility may further muddy
the waters with respect to civilian command responsibility in the ICC Statute.
Factually, the Akayesu case is more on point for this Article's
examination of the ICC civilian standard. Jean-Paul Akayesu was a civilian,
while the prison camp commander and other authorities in Celebici were more
253. See id.
254. Akayesu, supra note 96, § 6.2. Judge R6ling was quoted as stating that a court should:
[B]e careful in holding civilian government officials responsible for the behaviour of the
army in the field. Moreover, the Tribunal [RMT-FE] is here to apply the general principles
of law as they exist with relation to the responsibility for omissions. Consideration of
both law and policy, of both justice and expediency, indicate that this responsibility
should only be recognized in a very restricted sense.
Id.
255. Id.
256. Celebici, supra note 20, para. 363.
257. See id. para. 378. One can imagine a variety of situations where civilian superiors exert
around-the-clock, seven-days-a-week control over subordinates, including the interesting example of
private international security companies. See generally Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New
Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75 (1998) (discussing the legal status of private international security
companies).
258. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 355-63; Akayesu, supra note 96, § 6.2. Nevertheless,
he was a highly respected judge, according to editor Antonio Cassese in his work on Judge R6ling. See
ROLING, supra note 100, at vii-ix, 7.
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likely to be viewed as military commanders. 259 However, Akayesu's status
may be debatable. Akayesu was the mayor of Taba in Rwanda.260 During his
time as mayor, amidst the crisis in Rwanda, "hundreds of civilians... sought
refuge at the bureau communal" where Akayesu "was responsible for
maintaining law and public order., 261 Thus, given the chaos and abuse for
which Akayesu was convicted,262 one could counter-argue that the "bureau
communal" was similar to a prison camp and that Akayesu's authority was
more like a prison camp commander than a mayor. Thus, Akayesu's purely
civilian role26 3 may be analogized to that of a semi-military official, and thus
might fall under the "or effectively acting as a military commander" standard
in article 28(1) of the ICC Statute.
Regardless of Akayesu's status as either a civilian superior or a semi-
military commander, the ICTR used inconsistent reasoning to conclude that
Akayesu is not liable under command responsibility for any counts.264 The
Akayesu case holds that the superior-subordinate relationship element is not
satisfied, and, therefore, that Akayesu is not liable under the command
responsibility count. The court notes that after a certain point in the
progression of the Rwandan atrocities, Akayesu met the other two elements of
command responsibility (knowledge and inaction).265 The next section
examines the command responsibility holding for Akayesu and explains how
the court's inconsistent reasoning causes it to mishandle the analysis of the
superior-subordinate relationship element.
2. The ICTR in Akayesu Narrowly Construes Criminal Liability for
Civilians Arising from Command Responsibility
The record reveals that Akayesu progressed from little or no
participation to active participation in the crimes in Rwanda. Akayesu was a
teacher and school inspector before becoming bourgmestre (mayor) in 1993.
As the mayor of Taba, Akayesu "opposed [the killings] and attempted to
prevent them only until 18 April 1994 ... after which he... sometimes even
gave orders himself for bodily or mental harm to be caused to certain Tutsi,
259. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 1.2; Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 610-21,737.
260. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 1.2. Further, the court notes that:
Rwanda is divided into 11 prefectures, each of which is governed by a prefect. The
prefectures are further subdivided into communes which are placed under the authority of
bourgmestres. The bourgmestre of each commune is appointed by the President of the
Republic, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. In Rwanda, the
bourgmestre is the most powerful figure in the commune. His defacto authority in the
area is significantly greater than that which is conferred upon him dejure.
Id.
261. Id.; see Akayesu Summary, supra note 251, para. 26.
262. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 7.1.
263. See Akayesu Summary, supra note 251, para. 64.
264. See Akayesu, supra note 96, § 7.1. Originally, the prosecutor charged Akayesu with
command responsibility under article 6(3) of the ICTR statute for Counts 13-15. While the court
discharged the command responsibility claims, Akayesu was found guilty under ICTR article 6(1) for
direct participation in many of the crimes. See id.
265. See id. § 7.1.
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and endorsed and even ordered the killing of several Tutsi. '' 266 Several facts
weighed against Akayesu in the court's holding that he was guilty under
"direct" command responsibility.267 First, it was alleged that communal police
were present during the rape of Tutsi women.268 Second, witnesses testified
that Akayesu knew of the rape by statements he made.269 The court found
Akayesu guilty on many of the counts under article 6(1) of the ICTR statute,
the direct responsibility provision.270
Under its command responsibility analysis, the court noted that Akayesu
"had reason to know and in fact knew that acts of sexual violence were
occurring in or near premises of the bureau communal" and took no measures
to prevent or punish.271 But the court hesitated to attribute some actions to
Akayesu.272 The court had found Akayesu guilty of direct participation in
coercive sexual violence through orders he gave the Interahamwe militia.
273
Then, under the facts described above and with the stage set to hold Akayesu
liable under the command responsibility provisions in article 6(3), the court
threw out the command responsibility counts, holding that the superior-
subordinate relationship element was not met.274 The court felt that there was
insufficient evidence that the Interahamwe, the "armed local militia," were
subordinate to Akayesu. This reasoning seems highly inconsistent with the
court's direct participation liability holding under article 6(1), which was
explicitly based on Akayesu's ability to order the Interahamwe to cause a
Tutsi female to undress and do gyrmastics in a crowded courtyard.275
3. Applying Akayesu to the ICC Statute
The ICTR's holding seems to foreshadow ICC article 28(2)(b) because
the court seemed to desire a nexus between the crimes and the activities over
which Akayesu could control his subordinates. The Akayesu court stretched to
276make this holding. The ICC, on the other hand, will be peppered with
defense counsel arguments that article 28(2)(b) precludes liability. This is
unfortunate because 28(2)(b) is arguably ambiguous with respect to whether it
adds any content to the superior-subordinate relationship element.
266. See id. § 7.8; see also Akayesu Summary, supra note 251, para. 26 ("[Akayesu] opposed
and attempted to prevent [the crimes] only until 18 April 1994, but then acquiesced and even
encouraged their commission."); Bill Berkeley, Judgment Day, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at WI0
(reporting on the genocide in Rwanda and the Akayesu trial).
267. See infra Section I.C.
268. See Akayesu Summary, supra note 251, para. 27.
269. See id. ("[N]ever ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like' ....").
270. See Akayesu, supra note 94, § 7.1.
271. Id. § 7.7.
272. See id. ("Many of the beatings, rapes, and murders established by the evidence took place
away from the bureau communal premises.").
273. See id. The allegation was that Akayesu ordered the Interahamwe to undress a female
student and forced her to do "gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal in front
of a crowd." Id.
274. See id. § 7.1.
275. See id.
276. See supra notes 265-275 and accompanying text.
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Under the ICC provision, the Akayesu case facts would generate the
same outcome as the actual case, exoneration of Akayesu under the command
responsibility counts. Even if Akayesu were held to meet the ICC superior-
subordinate relationship standard, including article 28(2)(b), the new
knowledge element standard would exonerate him, at least before he began his
direct participation. If Akayesu opposed and tried to prevent the crimes
through April 18, 1994,27 then up to that point he would not have
"consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes.' 27 In fact,
because he knew of the crimes, as long as he took action within the limits of
his power to stop the crimes, both the knowledge and the inaction elements
would exonerate him from command responsibility criminal liability.279 In this
regard, article 28(2) can be seen as setting up perverse incentives because a
defendant like Akayesu will have a better defense if he can hide behind
"consciously disregarding," as opposed to having to prove that the corrective
action he took was not mere token action to prevent the crime or punish the
perpetrator. In sum, if he were tried under the ICC Statute, he would have a
better defense than his defenses under the ICTR Statute because "consciously
disregarding" gives him more protection "should have known" under the
command responsibility knowledge element.
VI. THE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE AND THE MILOSEVIC
INDICTMENT
A. Applying the Doctrine Against a Head of State
Part V has shown that under the ICC civilian command responsibility
standard, the cases of Hirota, Roechling, and Akayesu would have different
outcomes compared to their outcome if evaluated using the ICC military
standard. This analysis underscores the importance of the superior-subordinate
relationship element and its concern with the type and degree of control a
military commander or civilian superior has over his or her subordinates. This
analysis also underscores the critical nature of the knowledge element. Thus,
under the ICC, a civilian leader who is not "effectively acting as a military
commander," 280 and who is prosecuted for crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction, will benefit from the more favorable civilian command
responsibility standards, potentially to the detriment of the efficacy and
deterrence power of the court.
This objection is critical because civilian leaders can set policy and
objectives. They may exert control and authority in a myriad of ways that are
not "effectively military command., 281 Moreover, the less democratic the
277. See Akayesu Summary, supra note 251, para. 26.
278. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2)(a).
279. See id. arts. 28(2)(a), (c).
280. Id. art. 28(1).
281. Regarding the Tokyo Trials, one commentator noted that the defendants "Were by and
large 'Establishment' figures who had achieved prominence in the leadership of Japan and had won the
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regime, the more likely it is that the civilian leader's authority spans across
many industries and important societal institutions, including control over the
media.282 In all areas where the civilian leader exercises non-military control,
the ICC civilian standard gives the leader a greater opportunity strategically to
become willfully blind to the crimes committed by subordinates.
Considering the ICC Statute's status-based approach, much will turn on
the characterization of the civilian leader's role, because, if the civilian leader
is "effectively acting as a military commander," then ICC article 28(1) and its
tougher standards would apply. One possible example of a person effectively
acting as a military commander is a civilian head of state who has supreme
command powers over that country's armed forces. 83 This same individual
might also fall under "direct" command responsibility, which could apply to
either a military commander or a civilian superior. In either its direct form or
its imputed form, the command responsibility doctrine envisions and
implements criminal accountability that upwardly traverses the chain of
command to the culpable leader.
284
If the command responsibility doctrine is used to traverse the chain of
command for accountability then its ultimate use is applying it against a
country's highest political leader who has caused widespread crimes against
humanity. Such use has been rare. After World War I, the victors made
preparations contemplating a trial of the son of the Kaiser, but the tribunal was
never implemented.2 85 During the IMT-FE trials, several high-ranking
Japanese civilians were tried, but not the Emperor. 28 In 1998 in Rwanda, the
ICTR accepted the guilty plea of its former prime minister, making this the
first conviction of a head of state by an international tribunal.28 7 In the former
Yugoslavia, some high-ranking individuals were indicted in 1995 .288
confidence and approbation of their fellow countrymen through their own administrative competence,
intellectual excellence or distinguished military service." 2 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL,
supra note 144, at xxxvi.
282. Control over the media played an important part in the Rwandan genocide. See Jamie
Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
628, 629-32 (1997).
283. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 368.
284. See id. at 346 ("The inquiry will usually start with the perpetrator of the violation and then
gradually move up the chain of command to the superior who issued the order. Such a chain of
command can... reach the highest echelon ... including the head of State.").
285. See Parks, supra note 38, at 11-14.
286. See id. at 64 & n.214.
287. The ICTR had indicted the prime minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, for crimes against
humanity, complicity to homicide, and other counts. See Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, No. ICTR-97-
23-S, para. 3 (ICTR Sept. 4, 1998), available at Judgement and Sentence <http://www.un.orglictrl
englishljudgements/kambanda.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1999); Press Release: First-Ever Judgment of
Crime of Genocide, ICTR/INFO-9-2-136, Aug. 21, 1998, available at <http:lwww.un.orglictr/englishl
pressrelPR135E.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1999). Kambanda pleaded guilty to charges that included article
6(3) command responsibility counts. See id. para. 4.
Kambanda's guilty plea extinguished the need for the ICTR to construe the article 6(3) command
responsibility provisions in what likely would have been an even more complex factual analysis of the
three command responsibility elements than the ICTY had to undertake in the Celebici case.
288. Two individuals high in the command chain of the Serbian Democratic Party were
indicted on grounds that include command responsibility. See Indictment, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, No.
IT-95-5, paras. 3-8 (ICTY July 25, 1995), available at <http:llwww.un.orglicty/indictmentlenglish25-
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However, the events in Kosovo in 1999 triggered the first ever indictment "in
the history of [the ICTY] to charge a Head of State during an on-going armed
conflict with the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law."289 The ICTY accepted Prosecutor Louise Arbour's
indictment of Slobodan Milosevic and four others for direct command
responsibility and imputed command responsibility for various crimes against
Kosovo Albanians. 290 Besides branding Milosevic as a war criminal, the
indictment puts the command responsibility doctrine at center stage in the
international debate over Kosovo.
291
B. The Milosevic Case Under the ICC Statute
An examination of Milosevic's case under the ICC Statute will
summarize and reinforce the ideas presented in the earlier parts of this Article
by highlighting the potential outcomes under an ICC approach.
After the Milosevic indictment was on record and the Serbian troops had
withdrawn from Kosovo, the international community focused on collecting292
evidence of the crimes committed by Serbian forces. This evidence will
determine the strength of the ICTY Prosecutor's case against Milosevic if he
is apprehended for trial. Specifically, investigators are interested in any
evidence that can support accusations of "direct" command responsibility that
Milosevic planned and ordered the ethnic cleansing.293 A direct command
0795A.htm> (visited Nov. 5, 1999).
289. Press Release: President Milosevic and Four Other Senior FRY Officials Indicted for
Murder, Persecution and Deportation in Kosovo, No. JIPIU/403-E, May 27, 1999, available at
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p403-e.htm> (visited Nov. 5, 1999) (quoting Prosecutor Louise
Arbour in her application of indictment to Judge Hunt); see also Charles Trueheart, Kosovo in Crisis,
WASH. POST, May 28, 1999, at Al (referring to the joint indictment as "the first in history against a
wartime chief of state.').
290. See Milosevic Review of Indictment, supra note 8, paras. 6-14, 17. See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, ERASING HISTORY: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN Kosovo (1999), available at
<http://www.state.gov/www/regionseur/rpt_9905_ethnicksvotoc.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1999)
(detailing seven categories of violations by Serbian forces against Albanians in Kosovo).
291. "The evidence upon which this indictment was confirmed raises serious questions about
[Milosevic's and the others'] suitability to be the guarantors of any deal, let alone a peace agreement...
they have not been rendered less suitable by the indictment; the indictment has simply exposed their
suitability." Trueheart, supra note 289, at Al (quoting ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour).
292. See Elizabeth Neuffer, Indictment ofMilosevic to Test NATO's Will, BOSTON GLOBE, May
30, 1999, at El ("[E]very shred of evidence will be needed to make the case, should it ever come to
trial."); Ambassador David Scheffer, Remarks and Press Backgrounder in Brussels Concerning Kosovo,
M2 Presswire, May 18, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17564157 ("We have been co-operating with the
Yugoslav Tribunal with an accelerated and intensified information-sharing programme, many hundreds
of documents pertaining to Kosovo alone, classified and otherwise, have been provided to the
Tribunal.').
293. The Milosevic indictment alleges that Serbian forces engaged in "unlawful deportation
and forcible transfer of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes" and "engaged in a number of
killings of Kosovo Albanians... at numerous locations," and that the "forces of the FRY and Serbia
acting in concert have engaged in a well-planned and co-ordinated campaign of destruction of property."
Initial Indictment of Milosevic and Others, May 24, 1999, paras. 34-35, 37, available at
<http://www.un.orglicty/milosevic/052399app.htm> (visited Nov. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Milosevic
Indictment]. The indictment also relates the events in Kosovo to prior events in the former Yugoslavia:
Actions similar in nature took place during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between
1991 and 1995. During those wars, Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces forcibly expelled and
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responsibility claim creates the most solid case against Milosevic, while an
imputed command responsibility claim creates different issues of proof for the
prosecution.294 If taken into ICTY custody, Milosevic would be tried
according to that court's elucidation of the command responsibility doctrine,
much of which is expressed by the Celebici opinion.29 However, Part VI,
following the approach of Part V, examines the hypothetical outcome if
Milosevic were tried under the ICC Statute.
This analysis proceeds by considering several alternative classifications
for Milosevic's status under the ICC individual criminal responsibility
provisions. Each alternative, however, assumes that Milosevic is a civilian. By
original training, he is an attorney and his career before politics was in
management, banking, and oil.
2 96
First, it is possible that Milosevic would fall under article 25 of the ICC
Statute as one who "orders, solicits, or induces the commission of such a
crime. ' ,297 However, reports sugest that a direct "paper trail" evidencing
direct responsibility is unlikely.298 Therefore, a prosecutor may find it difficult
to prove that Milosevic personally ordered or solicited or induced the crime. If
this is the case, the second alternative is to consider Milosevic's situation
under ICC article 28(1) as a civilian "effectively acting as a military
commander."
The inquiry into the second alternative would focus more on the pre-
existing relationships between Milosevic and the Serbian forces that were
deployed in Kosovo, rather than on proving that a specific order was
transmitted to these forces to commit atrocities. The indictment recounts
Milosevic's de jure authority over these forces as well as his "extensive de
facto control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the
conduct of the offenses." 299 Assuming that Milosevic's level of control over
deported non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from areas under Serbian control utilizing
the same method of operations as have been used in Kosovo in 1999. Id. para. 35. Finally, the
indictment specifically alleges Milosevic's direct command responsibility by stating that "the planning,
preparation and execution of the campaign undertaken by forces of the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo, was
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Slobodan Milosevic." Id.
para. 38.
294. One commentator appraises the evidentiary case against Milosevic under imputed
command responsibility with a Yamashita-like approach:
Since it is unlikely that Milosevic has allowed documentary evidence to be preserved that
would link him to atrocities in Kosovo, the prosecutor's office will have to rely heavily
on circumstantial evidence to build its case. This means identifying a consistent "pattern
of conduct" that links Milosevic to similar illegal acts, to the officers and staff involved,
or to the logistics involved in carrying out atrocities. The very fact that atrocities have
been so widespread, flagrant, grotesque and similar in nature makes it near certain that
Milosevic knew of them; despite his recent protestations to the contrary, it defies logic to
suggest that he could be unaware of what his forces are doing.
Mark S. Ellis, Non-Negotiable; War Criminals Belong in the Dock, Not at the Table, WASH. POST, May
9, 1999, at B I.
295. See Celebici, supra note 20, paras. 330-400.
296. See Milosevic Indictment, supra note 293, para. 41.
297. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(3)(b).
298. See Neuffer, supra note 292, at El ('CThose familiar with Mr. Milosevic's habits say he
rarely leaves an incriminating paper trail, doesn't use the telephone, and issues no written directives.").
299. Milosevic Indictment, supra note 293, paras. 55-62.
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the armed forces is sufficient to qualify him as a civilian effectively acting as
a military commander, then his guilt, under the ICC Statute, would turn on
whether he "knew, or owing to the circumstances at the time, should have
known," of the atrocities. 300 There will be strong circumstantial evidence that
he knew because of the direct communications from the ICTY Prosecutor
warning Milosevic of his responsibilities under international law. 301 Thus, it is
likely that a strong case would exist under the ICC to try Milosevic using the
military commander standard.
The third alternative in analyzing the Milosevic indictment under the
ICC would be to consider the less likely alternative that Milosevic would not
be found to be operating as a military commander and would thus fall into the
ICC civilian standard of article 28(2). Under the civilian standard, the
prosecutor would have to prove, under the knowledge element, that Milosevic
"consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated" that crimes
occurred.30 2 Given the reports that Milosevic is not fond of "paper trails,"
3 3
this might be an insurmountable burden of proof. Under the superior-
subordinate relationship element, the ICC civilian standard would also
complicate the prosecutor's proof process because of the nexus element
requiring that the subordinates' crimes must concern "activities that were
within the effective responsibility and control of the superior.3104 This
evaluation would depend on many of the same factors necessary to determine
whether Milosevic was "effectively acting as a military commander," such as
the extent and scope of any superior-subordinate relationships, or his degree
of power to control and punish those under his authority.0 5
Just as Milosevic's ultimate culpability at the ICTY will be a function of
the evidence, a more detailed evaluation of his situation under the ICC civilian
standard is limited when most of the underlying facts supporting prosecutor
Arbour's indictment are under a non-disclosure order to protect witnesses
until the five indicted individuals are apprehended. 0 6 Astonishing volumes of
evidence exist that human rights violations occurred in Kosovo, 30 7 and there is
ample circumstantial evidence linking Milosevic through the chain of
command to the armed forces that were deployed in Kosovo. But where
300. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(a).
301. See Press Release-Justice Louise Arbour, the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal,
Writes to President Milosevic and Other Senior Officials in Belgrade and Kosovo To Remind Them of
Their Responsibilities Under International Law, No. JLIPIU/389-E, Mar. 26, 1999, available at
<http:lwww.un.orgliety/pressreallp4O4-e.htm> (visited Nov. 5, 1999) (quoting from the Prosecutor's
letter. "[l~n the light of current reports of escalating violence in Kosovo, I am gravely concerned that
serious violations of international humanitarian law continue to be committed... I therefore look to you
to exercise your authority over your subordinates ... to prevent the commission of further crimes.").
302. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2)(a).
303. See supra note 298.
304. Rome Statute, supra note 2, 28(2)(b).
305. See Celebici, supra note 20, para. 354.
306. See Milosevic Review of Indictment, supra note 8, paras. 30-37.
307. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE ETHNic CLEANSING IN Kosovo: FAcT SHEET
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM U.S. GOVT. SOURCES, available at <http://www.state.gov/wwwl
regions/eur/rpt_990604_ksvo__ethnic.html> (visited Nov. 5, 1999) (detailing atrocities and war crimes
by location and type).
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Milosevic would ultimately fall along the ICC scale of article 25 direct
command responsibility, versus the article 28(1) military standard, versus the
article 28(2) civilian standard, is unknowable until more facts are available
about the superior-subordinate relationship element and about Milosevic's
level of knowledge. Regardless of the evidentiary uncertainty underlying these
first two elements, with respect to the third element of command
responsibility, it is readily apparent that there was either inaction, or
ineffective action, to stop the atrocities.
VII. CONCLUSION
The preceding two parts have applied the ICC command responsibility
doctrine to several prior civilian cases and discussed how the doctrine might
apply to the highest level in the chain of command-the head of state.
Although there are only a small number of civilian command responsibility
cases, the examples applied to the ICC civilian command responsibility
standard illustrate several factors. First, at the ICC, many civilian superiors
who might be effectively operating as military commanders will have an
alternative plea in defense. They will plead that they should fall under the less
strict civilian standard of article 28(2). In close cases, some perpetrators will
slip into the civilian standard, and probability dictates that at least some of
these do so at the expense of justice.
Second, how helpful this tactic is for defendants depends on the extent to
which the lesser knowledge element, "consciously disregarded," lowers the
criminal requirement of a duty to keep informed. In the Hirota case, defendant
foreign minister Hirota would likely be exonerated under the new civilian
standard. Similarly, in the Roechling case, the defendant industrialist would
likely escape liability for mistreatment of workers. The Akayesu case from the
ICTR deals a further blow to a robust civilian command responsibility
doctrine, to the extent it would be followed for the command responsibility
part of its holding. These three case examples reviewed in Part V illustrate the
potential effect of article 28(2).
Third, the degree of effect that article 28(2) has on the justice and
efficacy of the permanent court depends also on whether article 28(2)(b)
introduces a new nexus element for prosecutors to prove. As a summary of the
comparison undertaken in this Article, the following table illustrates all of
these differences.
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TABLE 2- SUMMARY COMPARISON OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
ELEMENTS
Command ICTY- Celebici ICC-Military - 28(1) ICC- Non-Military - 28(2)
Responsibility Elements
committed by a A military commander or superior and subordinate
subordinate person effectively acting as relationships not described in
a military commander.., paragraph 1 ... committed by
committed by forces under subordinates under his or her
superior-subordinate his or her effective effective authority and control,
command and control, or as a result of his or her failure
relationship effective authority and to exercise control properly
control as the case may be, over such subordinates
as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control
properly over such forces
knew or had reason knew or, owing to the knew, or consciously
to know that the circumstances at the time, disregarded information which
subordinate was should have known that the clearly indicated, that the
knowledge about to commit forces were committing or subordinates were committing
such acts or had about to commit such or about to commit such
done so crimes crimes
failed to take the failed to take all necessary failed to take all necessary and
necessary and and reasonable measures reasonable measures within his
reasonable measures within his or her power to or her power to prevent or
inaction to prevent such acts prevent or repress their repress their commission or to
or to punish the commission or to submit the submit the matter to the
perpetrators thereof matter to the competent competent authorities for
authorities for investigation investigation and prosecution
and prosecution
nexus between criminal The crimes concerned
activities of subordinate activities that were within the
and subordinate N/A N/A effective responsibility and
activities controlled by control of the superior
superior
The command responsibility doctrine has developed in short bursts and
then lain dormant for long stretches of time before resurfacing.308 The post-
World War H international military tribunal cases at Nuremberg and Tokyo
provided the launching point for the modem doctrine. 30 9 Commentators have
noted the effect on the doctrine from international treaties such as Additional
Protocol I and events such as the My Lai massacre of the Vietnam conflict.
310
More recently, efforts to draft a statute for a permanent international criminal
court have paralleled the regretful need to establish the ICTY and ICTR.3 n
The aggregate justice and efficacy of the ICC will be the result of many
factors. On balance, the civilian command responsibility provisions reduce the
court's power to bring human rights violators before the rule of law because
308. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 351-68.
309. See Green, supra note 68, at 327-40.
310. See Howard, supra note 192, at 8-14; Parks, supra note 38, at 1-2.
311. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at x. Orentlicher comments that the current tribunals
influenced the ICC as follows:
The legitimacy of the law emanating from the ad hoc tribunals was put to a critical test
during the diplomatic conference to establish [the ICC] .... The statute adopted on the
final day of that conference provided powerful vindication of the two tribunals'
jurisprudence. Indeed, many aspects of the Rome statute would have been inconceivable
without the foundation laid by the Hague [ICTY] and Arusha [ICTR] tribunals.
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they undercut the court's deterrent goals for civilian violators. In short, the
civilian command responsibility standard is one small negative for the court,
but a negative that threatens to make real the concerns expressed by Louise
Arbour, ICTY prosecutor, in a statement to the U.N. Preparatory Committee
for the ICC: Should it be a weak and powerless institution, not only will it
lack legitimacy, but it will betray the very human rights ideals that will have
312inspired its creation.
Hopefully, the sheer existence of the court and its positive attributes will
weigh the balance against Arbour's concerns.
312. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 11.

